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Buffer or Highway: Cyclical Patterns of Security Development in East Central Europe

by

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ABSTRACT

Since 1919, security foundations and specific architecture in East Central Europe have followed a repetitive cycle of policy behavior on behalf of the external power placed by circumstances into a position of preponderant influence within the region. This cycle of policy behavior contains elements of initial success, as well as of eventual failure. Exposing the two contradictory elements of this repetitive cycle, by disclosing a consistent pattern contained in selected variables, and then understanding the relationship between the current security environment in East Central Europe and traditional security conditions is the task of this analysis. This relationship suggests that the United States and its Western European allies should exercise caution and restraint with regard to formal integration of East Central Europe within the common security institutions of the West. The process of integration should be limited to informal or symbolic measures which encourage economic and political development, but which retain East Central Europe as a buffer between Western Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, AND THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	10
	A. THE ACTIONS OF DEAD MEN	11
	B. WHAT IS EAST CENTRAL EUROPE	16
	C. SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS: IN DEFENSE OF THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE	19
	D. DEPTH OF THE ANALYSIS: HOW FAR BACK IS ENOUGH .	21
	E. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORY	22
	F. HYPOTHESIS	28
III.	PYGMY BETWEEN TWO GIANTS	30
	A. CONTEXT: IMPERIAL DECLINE AND VIOLENT BIRTH . .	30
	B. CONCLUSIONS	45
IV.	AT THE CREATION	46
	A. 1919: EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST SECURITY PHASE	46
	B. 1945: STALIN, EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE SECOND SECURITY PHASE	59
	C. CONCLUSIONS	73
V.	FROM BUFFER TO HIGHWAY	74
	A. 1922-1945: THE COLLAPSE OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM	75
	B. 1989: MORAL COLLAPSE AND THE END OF PHASE TWO .	94
	C. CONCLUSIONS	112
VI.	REBUILDING THE BUFFER, DESTROYING THE HIGHWAY .	114

A.	IN DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL FOUNDATIONS: COLLECTIVE SECURITY VERSUS THE REGIONAL HEGEMON	116
B.	HAPHAZARD BIRTH, POLITICAL CONTEST, AND THE THREAT TO THE WEST	121
C.	GRAND STRATEGY: APPEARANCE INCONSISTENT WITH REALITY	130
VI.	CONCLUSION	136
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	138

I. INTRODUCTION

*"When the senior statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers met ... to shape the peace that was supposed to justify all the slaughter and misery of the long war, it was expected that the result of their labors would be the creation, not just of a peace in Europe, but of something resembling a new world order."*¹

The United States and its Western European allies should exercise caution and restraint with regard to formal integration of East Central Europe within the common security institutions of the West. Many analysts argue otherwise: that the collapse of Soviet Power has provided a unique opportunity to integrate formerly closed societies into the Western system, to move beyond the process of containment so central to previous security calculations, and to, in effect, roll back Russian power and potential future influence in East Central Europe to a degree unimagined by the most ardent Cold Warriors. These analysts would further argue that such a unique opportunity can be fulfilled only through strong integration with the common institutions of the West; that any other course would discourage political and economic progress in East Central Europe, promote regional instability, and pave

¹George F. Kennan describing the atmosphere surrounding the Paris Peace Conference in 1918, in Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, (New York: New American Library, 1960), 116.

the way for a return of Russian influence should Russia fail to progress sufficiently from the bitter ashes of her past.²

It is the project of this thesis to prove this quite popular view in favor of formal integration wrong, and to argue that the process of integration should be limited to informal or symbolic measures which encourage economic and political development, but which retain East Central Europe as a buffer between Western Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Throughout this century, East Central Europe has provided its services as such a buffer, first on behalf of the United States and Western Europe, and then on behalf of the Soviet Union. Despite the most optimistic wishes, the burden of this at times difficult history is inescapable, can be neither discarded nor ignored, and must be factored into any future regional security calculation.

What follows is an acknowledgement of international change tempered by an abiding belief in the power of historical continuity. Writing on the subject of the power of history in the face of an accelerating social dynamic, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., noted that:

²For example, in an article about revamping the Atlantic Alliance, Henry Kissinger remarked that, "no issue is more urgent than to relate the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe to Western Europe and NATO. At least Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should be permitted to join the Community rapidly. It is hardly to the credit of the West that after talking for a generation about freedom for Eastern Europe, so little is done to vindicate it. Moreover, if a no-man's-land is to be avoided in Eastern Europe, NATO ought to leave no doubt that pressures against these countries would be treated as a challenge to Western security, whatever the formal aspect of this undertaking." Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," The International Herald Tribune, 2 March 1992, 5.

The law of acceleration hurtles us into the inscrutable future. But it cannot wipe the slate of the past. History haunts even generations who refuse to learn history. Rhythms, patterns, continuities, drift out of time long forgotten to mold the present and to color the shape of things to come. Science and technology revolutionize our lives, but memory, tradition, and myth frame our response. Expelled from individual consciousness by the rush of change, history finds its revenge by stamping the collective unconscious with habits, values, expectations, dreams. The dialectic between past and future will continue to form our lives.³

Nowhere does the dialectic between the 'slate of the past' and the 'inscrutable future' become more clearly important than in the fashioning of a New World Order - an idea ill-defined, fuzzy, and poorly understood by commentators and policy makers alike.⁴

This thesis is a reconciliation of that dialectic in the application of the New World Order to what was once considered Eastern Europe, but which is more properly called East Central Europe. The first question then is how such a reconciliation can be accomplished. In his seminal work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, historian Paul Kennedy argues that the United States is in decline as a Great Power, primarily

³Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), xii.

⁴Perhaps a more practical expression of Schlesinger's idea is that, "we are used to saying that everything is moving along much faster than it used to, in communication, in the development of science. Yet the international system had, before the tumultuous events of the fall of 1989, been standing remarkably still since the end of World II, in terms of alliance structures; in terms of boundaries; in the absence of major wars ... Our conscious assessments of what is happening have probably insufficiently juxtaposed this acceleration of science and the deceleration of international realignments." George H. Quester, "Knowing and Believing about Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1991, 280.

because the costs of maintaining a military structure consistent with Great Power commitments have outstripped the benefits that those commitments bring to the American economy as a whole. A strategic climate of rising costs is met by a receding economic ability to pay those costs.⁵

The reason why Kennedy considers this negative cost to benefit ratio as evidence of American decline is that a similar ratio, arrived at by a similar train of circumstances, has been central to the decline of almost every Great Power of the preceding five-hundred years.⁶ In other words, the independent variables associated with imperial overstretch (economic costs versus economic benefits) have in almost every case yielded a consistent outcome variable involving Great Power status. Although other factors were also present⁷, Kennedy concludes that, "it is precisely because the power position of the leading nations has closely paralleled their relative economic position over the past five centuries that

⁵The actual phrase that Kennedy uses is for the point at which costs overtake benefits is the point of 'imperial overstretch'. Before that point, military power advances the economic position and Great Power status of specific states; after the point of imperial overstretch, military power reverses the process. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (New York: Random House, 1987), xv-xxv.

⁶Kennedy includes in his study the Hapsburg Empire of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 18th century, the dynastic wars of the 18th century, the Napoleonic era, the Pax Britannia and the era of 19th century European imperial expansion, Imperial Russia in the 19th century, and the United States in the 20th century.

⁷for example, "geography, military organization, national moral, the alliance system, and many other factors." Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, xxiv.

it seems worthwhile asking what the implications of today's economic and technological trends might be for the current balance of power."⁸

Without speculating on conclusions regarding American decline, this thesis borrows heavily from Kennedy's methodology in the application of the New World Order to the security problems of East Central Europe in the post-Cold War world, albeit with a more limited scope and a different list of comparative variables.⁹ The central puzzle concerns the role, prospects and future of East Central Europe within a Western-dominated, post Cold War security arrangement - specifically by examining the East Central European role in past arrangements, and by applying the resulting model to current conditions. Do current circumstances indicate a future in continuity with the past? If so, to what degree

⁸Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, xxiv.

⁹Any model based on historical analogy runs certain risks. The first involves the problem of choosing appropriate precedents, a problem compounded by two factors: accurate discernment of a pattern within each precedent, and precise matching of the pattern amongst the selected historical cases. The second risk involves the problems of generalization and assumption - two techniques necessary in the search for analogy and pattern. Although this thesis draws much of its inspiration from Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, it owes more in terms of practical guidance to Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, (New York: The Free Press, 1986) which provides a complete text of the problems involved and the techniques needed. Particularly useful are chapter 3: "Unreasoning from Analogies," 34-57, chapter 5: "Dodging Bothersome Analogies," 75-90, chapter 7: "Finding History that Fits," 111-134, chapter 11: "Noticing Patterns," 196-211, and chapter 14: "Seeing Time as a Stream," 247-270. Will and Ariel Durant's The Story of Civilization interestingly illustrates the problem. After eleven volumes covering roughly nine-thousand pages of text, the author produced a final volume, The Lessons of History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), of one-hundred and two pages.

will current policy proscriptions conspire to remove East Central Europe from previous security constraints?

Within a security context, East Central Europe has survived three distinct phases since its inception (each phase defined by the alternating hegemonic status over security arrangements of either Russia or a particular country or group of countries within the West).¹⁰ The first phase began with the birth of East Central Europe - assured by Western support amidst imperial ruin and Bolshevik generation in 1919 - and ended with the Soviet occupation in 1945. The second phase began with the cementing of Soviet hegemony in the late 1940s, and ended only with the revolutions in 1989. The third phase began in 1989 with the reestablishment of nominally democratic regimes - again apparently dependent on Western support - and will undoubtedly end at some undetermined time in the future.

In each of the first two phases, almost identical strategic assessments of threat dictated that East Central Europe exist as a buffer on behalf of the hegemonic power, despite the fact that the political context and political personalities behind those assessments were markedly different. To paraphrase Kennedy, it seems worthwhile asking what the implications of today's threats to the West might be

¹⁰The issue of what constitutes hegemony is complex, and popular definitions are by no means universal. Subsequent sections will give a clearer working definition.

for the current role of East Central Europe within a Western dictated security system. The answer (and certainly the main argument of this thesis) might be that current threats demand a consistent role for East Central Europe as buffer between East and West.

What would prevent such continuity? In the first place, perhaps nowhere was the acceleration of change more eagerly anticipated than in the closed societies of Eastern Europe; no region was promised more benefit from the end of the Cold War; nowhere has policy been driven more by the ideology of progress and hope. This promise was stated effectively by Dwight Eisenhower:

The American conscience can never know peace until these (enslaved) people are restored again to being masters of their own fate. Never shall we desist in our aid to every man and woman of those shackled lands who is dedicated to the liberation of his fellows.¹¹

This promise to East Central Europe was heady stuff indeed, and implied - absent Soviet power - spiritual, political, economic, and military integration with the ideals and common institutions of the West;¹² a common dream suggested a common destiny. As noted by Secretary of State James A. Baker III, the promise, that "we (the West) will welcome into the

¹¹Remark made during the first Presidential campaign, August 1952. Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez, Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East, (New York: The Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1981), 351.

¹²Remembering of course that when Eisenhower made this statement, the process of integration so recognizable now in Western Europe had barely begun.

community of democratic nations those new political entities who believe in democratic values and follow democratic practices," has not been diluted with time.¹³

What results is a competition between those factors - such as the ideological bias cited above - which would encourage acceleration into Schlesinger's inscrutable future, and those factors (cited in the bulk of this study) which would encourage consistency with policies of the past. This competition involves a number of central elements:

1. limits, definitions, theory, and hypothesis;
2. the birth of East Central Europe within the context of the long-term struggle between Soviet Russia and the industrial West;
3. the circumstances surrounding the creation of the first and second phases in 1919 and 1945 respectively;
4. the explanations for the destruction of the first and second phases;
5. analysis, based on the developed model, of the present role of East Central Europe within an evolving, Western-dominated, post-Cold War arrangement,
6. and finally, investigation of the future role and security prospects of East Central Europe with respect to this previous analysis.

To what degree will international change - the application of the New World Order to East Central Europe - be tempered by the power of historical continuity?

¹³Secretary of State James A. Baker III, "American and the collapse of the Soviet Empire: What Has to Be Done," from a speech at Princeton University, 12 December 1991, printed by the U.S. Department of State, office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, 10.

One final thought before proceeding: Karl Jaspers once wrote that, "We find genuine tragedy ... only in that destruction which does not prematurely cut short development and success, but which, instead, grows out of success itself."¹⁴ Victory in the Cold War was a success beyond measure; will success allow a tragedy that is its equal?

¹⁴Karl Jaspers, Tragedy is not Enough, quote in William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: Delta Books, 1959), x.

II. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, AND THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

*"I feel strongly the time has arrived for you again to reassert your spiritual leadership of democracy in the world as opposed to tyrannies of all kinds."*¹⁵

*"The very ideas that stirred Jefferson and Montesquieu resonate today in the words of Havel and Geremek. They echo in our collective historical memory, and they illuminate our path to the future."*¹⁶

The purpose of the first chapter is to establish the relationship between East Central Europe, current discussions on post-Cold War security architecture in the New World Order, and the relevance of historical analysis on those current discussions. After establishing the central methodological assertion of the thesis as a whole, that such a relationship can be made, the first chapter further indicates how historical analysis is used in this study to illuminate the current security environment, and, in broad terms, what such illumination might indicate for the subsequent prospects of East Central Europe. Establishing the central relationship

¹⁵Letter from Herbert Hoover to Woodrow Wilson concerning the Nansen Plan for humanitarian aid to Europe. Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking - Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1967), 27.

¹⁶From Secretary of State James A. Baker's remarks before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, June 6, 1990. James A. Baker, "CSCE: The Conscience of the Continent," Current Policy, No. 1280, (Washington D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, 1990), 1.

between East Central Europe, post-Cold War security architecture, and historical analysis involves investigation of four central elements: the advantages of historical review over other methods of analysis, the scope and definitions which confine historical review in this study to proportions which are both manageable and which provide the clearest insights, the factors which confirm the utility of a regional perspective at a time when the traditional alliance structure in East Central Europe has disintegrated, the analytical constructs and conceptual foundations central to the methodology upon which the relationship between past events and current security discussions is based, and the hypothetical conclusions towards which the historical analysis in this study will progress.

A. THE ACTIONS OF DEAD MEN

Concerning the post-Cold War security prospects of East Central Europe, why base analysis on a sort of anecdotal survey of diplomatic history? Surely political science has progressed beyond such a crude tool for understanding future events - has streamlined the historical review into a concise set of theories, rigorously tested and validated, which remove from the analyst the necessity of contact with the messy, confusing, often unrelated, and even more often contradictory details which so frequently characterize the narrative recounting of past circumstances. Why not say that the causes

of a certain policy were simply the inevitable outcome of a theoretically circumscribed world (a world defined by International Relations theory, structural realism, game theory, Great Power theory, deterrence theory, etc.), and avoid entirely the unique qualities of the specific diplomatic policy under discussion? Is not the recounting of already known historical events the political science equivalent of reinventing the wheel? Even if historical analysis proves pertinent and interesting, does any sort of *mechanism* protrude from the past to impinge upon the conduct of current and future events?

In the absence of a clear blueprint for political action (such as that provided by the Soviet threat to the industrial West), historical anecdote is used to a remarkable degree to justify specific policies. Past triumphs, and especially past mistakes, have been used since the end of the Cold War to sell a variety of security initiatives not readily justifiable by means other than historical reference. Examples of such justifications include the speech by Secretary of State James A. Baker to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in which the continued human rights orientation of that organization is ordained and mandated by the "collective historical memory (of) the very ideas that so stirred Jefferson and Montesquieu."¹⁷

¹⁷James A. Baker, "CSCE: The Conscience of the Continent," 1.

In testimony before Congress by General John R. Galvin, continued American troop presence in Europe is supported by the record of "the first half of this century, (when) conflicts and instability in Europe caused (the United States) to send hundreds of thousands of American troops to fight in two bloody wars in order to restore peace."¹⁸ The costs of American retreat from European involvement were strongly framed by historical anecdote by President Bush in his press conference at the NATO Summit in Rome:

One can't predict with totality where ... events will lead us. ... History shows that we have a stake in a peaceful Europe. ... we are going to be able to participate fully ... I'd say to the isolationists in the United States: Look at your history. Don't pull back into some fortress America."¹⁹

The degree to which historical experience actually influences the decision making process of political leadership is difficult to know. The degree to which political leadership uses precedent and tradition to sell policy,

¹⁸Statement of General John R. Galvin, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services on March 3, 1992, p.2.

¹⁹President Bush, "The President's News Conference in Rome, Italy, November 8, 1991, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, November 11, 1991 vol 27, No. 45, pp. 1575-1615, 1607. Other examples include a statement by Secretary Baker in which the costs of failure to adequately support the revolutions of 1989 are compared those costs endured by the West after "the collapse of the promising democratic revolution in Petrograd in February 1917." James A. Baker, "America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What has to be Done," 2. Testimony before Congress by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney concerning the 1993 Defense Budget quoted President Bush on the issue of cutbacks: "This deep and no deeper. To do less would be insensible to progress, but to do more would be ignorant of history." "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Connection with the FY 1993 Budget for the Department of Defense, January 31, 1992," 6.

however, appears to be high indeed. Historical references (no matter how inaccurate) are perceived as factual references; historical personalities are real people; historical events really happened. The fact that history is used to justify so much, demands an analysis which uses history well, even if that analysis does no more than to dispel the historical foundations of specific policy justifications.

Nowhere is this need to either confirm or dispel allusions to historical precedent more evident than in discussions of what should be done with the post-Cold War states of East Central Europe. An analyst reflecting on the political environment of East Central Europe between the two World Wars concluded that:

the accumulated heritage of national strife and injury that had divided Eastern Europe for centuries ... gave them all alike a sharper and deeper historic consciousness than the nations of Western Europe. ... Like the Irish, the only Western nation with a comparable experience, these peoples regained their freedom because they lived among their ancient wrongs and glories. History was the stuff of their politics, and all their politics turned back to history. ... The only Eastern European nations that escaped the self-imposed burden of a mighty past were Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.²⁰

Although the East Central Europe which has emerged from the Soviet shadow is beset by a certain exhaustion, although the reality of a global superpower world has made puny the regional visions of greatness embodied in the East Central European historical experience, and although some of the new

²⁰Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," in Arnold Toynbee, ed., The world in March 1939, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 221-222.

political leadership in East Central Europe contain men of exceptional moral character, the regional experience since the collapse of the Berlin wall suggests caution towards those who would say that history no longer plays a prominent role in either popular identity, or specific state activities.²¹

Also, historical analysis as a window on the future and as a guide to current policy has not been barren of past successes, however rarely they occur, and despite how often they are ignored. The Truman Doctrine and the original Cold War strategy of Containment were based on an historical analysis of the roots of Soviet conduct, and the implications that that analysis held for Western policy directed against Soviet expansion. The success of the resulting Cold War strategy appears to have validated its historical foundation.²²

²¹For example, in the fighting between Serbia and Bosnia, many Serbs appear to remain unremorseful about atrocities committed in Sarajevo. "Indeed, as in almost every encounter here these days, any mention of atrocities said to be committed by Serbs elicits a stream of counterclaims of Serbian suffering at the hands of rivals and neighbors, starting in the present and going back through both world wars to the period of Turkish domination and Austro-Hungarian swagger."

As one Serb explained the situation, "he said he did not think that people in the West understood history. They should know that Serbs had lived under Turkish domination, ... and he was certain that Slavic Muslims in Bosnia were intent on establishing an Islamic state and a Muslim foothold in Europe. 'If they win, the Turks will be back,' he added." Michael T. Kaufman, "Serbs See Themselves as the World's Victims," The New York Times, June 7, 1992, 6.

²²An example of historical analysis proved to be both accurate and ignored was contained in a memorandum of the Historical Adviser to the British Foreign Office on February 1925, in which was predicted the consequences of a German-Russian alliance cemented by an attack on Poland: "Has anyone attempted to realize what would happen ... if the Czechoslovak State were to be so curtailed and dismembered that in fact it disappeared from the map of Europe? ... Imagine, for instance, that under some improbable condition, Austria rejoined Germany; that Germany using the discontented minority in Bohemia, demanded a new frontier far over the mountains ... This

Since historical analogy plays a prominent role in current foreign policy declarations, and since historical experience is such a central element in the conduct of affairs in East Central Europe, and since historical insight has sometimes proved to have been a useful guide in foreign policy formulation, what remains for this analysis is to decide how to use history as a guideline for current policy discussions on the post-Cold War security environment. Specifically, who should be considered in the definition of East Central Europe? In what way should East Central Europe be considered (as a unit, or as a series of unique states not subject to regional analysis)? How far back should the historical examination of East Central Europe go? How is the scope of the historical review unified within a theoretical or conceptual framework, so as to prevent the narrative from devolving into a series of 'just so' stories? What are the hypothetical outcomes of the theoretical framework?

B. WHAT IS EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

Prior to March 1991, the fundamental question of what is East Central Europe would not have been difficult to answer, and any regional analysis would have proceeded from a commonly held set of assumptions. East Central Europe included the

would be catastrophic, and, even if we neglected to interfere in time to prevent it, we should afterwards be driven to interfere, probably too late." Sir James Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, (London: Methuen, 1930), 183-184, in Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 239-240.

Warsaw Pact members, Yugoslavia, and Albania - the Communist states outside of the Soviet Union. Several things have challenged that old equation. In March 1991 the Warsaw Pact was formally dissolved, completing the process of disentanglement from Soviet control begun in 1989. Soon after, following the August Coup in 1991, the former republics of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Moldova became independent, and the Soviet Union was replaced by a vaguely defined Commonwealth of Independent States. Those qualities which had once defined Eastern Europe as East Central Europe, a military alliance of Communist governments outside of the Soviet Union, as well as Albania and Yugoslavia, no longer exist. In particular, the addition of a number of new states which consider themselves to be European rather than Russian has confused things considerably.

Putting aside for a moment the question of whether East Central Europe can continued to be analyzed as a regional entity (as opposed to a series of unique individual states), a singularly difficult and arbitrary question concerns the inclusion of the former Soviet Republics within the broader definition of Eastern Europe. Should these states be considered along side those of East Central Europe in policy analysis? And does their membership dilute insights gained from a regional perspective? No firm test of membership makes a case for the Baltic Republics, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Moldova either way. Absent clear criteria, the former Soviet

Republics are not considered in this analysis. Although none are completely satisfactory, several factors support this exclusion and subsequent concentration on East Central Europe alone. Most important, of course, is the fact of formal (as opposed to de facto) membership in the Soviet Union for much of the period examined in this study. For the political leadership in these countries, the bulk of foreign policy efforts in the foreseeable future will involve the sorting out of this Soviet legacy, and the formalizing of relationships within the Commonwealth of Independent States.²³ Also, for political leadership in Western Europe and the United States, the Soviet legacy provides a significant psychological barrier not found in discussions of countries not formerly within Soviet borders.²⁴ For want of more strict conditions, this

²³This is a tenuous criteria for exclusion, but one which has a parallel in the example of Greece. Prior to the political alignments of the Cold War, Greece, like the other Balkan states, was consistently defined as being part of Eastern Europe. A forty-three year affiliation with NATO has changed that perceptual affiliation. Greece now is rarely thought of as Eastern European, and is more often referred to in policy discussions as the southern flank of Western Europe.

²⁴There is no real reason why this should be so, but nonetheless it does appear to be so. Present and future policies are the subject of chapter 5, but one example illustrates the point. In a discussion of the Western European Union (WEU), Secretary General Dr. William van Eckland proposed a three stage membership expansion strategy for the future. The first stage would involve membership of the Northern Tier countries once those countries had met certain economic, political, and military criteria; the second stage would involve membership of the Southern Tier countries at a later time, but under similar admissions requirements. Discussion of the third stage became rather vague, however, and left one with the impression that beyond the former borders of the Soviet Union lay the great unknown, and that calculations pertinent to the first two membership expansions did not apply to countries situated there. In chapter 5, this reticence is contrasted with more expansive policy statements regarding larger and less defined organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Dr. Willem Frederik van Eekelen, Secretary-General of the Western European Union, in a lecture on the future of a common European defense identity, given at the

analysis focusses on East Central Europe exclusively, which is to say Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and what remains from the breakup of Yugoslavia

C. SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS: IN DEFENSE OF THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The confusion over which countries should be included in this analysis raises a number of pertinent questions: is it still appropriate to discuss policy in terms of East Central Europe? By contrast, few when discussing Japan or China think in terms of an Asian policy; the differences between the two countries are simply too great, and, realistically, demand individual policies which are at best mutually compatible. Should the countries of East Central Europe be any different? Does a regional perspective provide any useful insight? If East Central Europe is still a realistic policy concept, who should be included in it? What characterizes those that are included?

East Central Europe is collectively defined by geographic position, historical circumstance, and resulting geopolitical weakness²⁶ - three criteria which allow the utility of a regional perspective by constraining the foreign policy options of the individual states; common constraints suggest a common identity, despite the very real differences among the

²⁶Janal Postgraduate Sem 61, April 29, 1992.

²⁶Each of these factors are discussed at some length in subsequent sections.

individual societies. These common constraints have served to insure that security arrangements in East Central Europe have historically been determined not by regional wishes, but by the wishes of Great Powers operating on regional borders. The resulting hegemon-client relationship, particularly with regard to the conduct of policy towards a danger which directly threatens the hegemonic power, has traditionally defined the East Central European security environment, and has been the source of the group identity ascribed to what is at heart an incredibly diverse region. It is the assertion that the current security environment is *still* defined not by the wishes of East Central European societies or governments, but by the traditional constraints of a hegemon-client relationship, which continues to validate a regional perspective.

Nonetheless, analysts often distinguish within East Central Europe between a Northern Tier of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and a Southern Tier of Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and whatever states will proceed out of the ongoing Yugoslavian Civil War.⁴⁶ Although the bulk of this analysis considers East Central Europe as a whole, certain policy recommendations benefit from the distinction between Northern Tier and Southern Tier.

⁴⁶Candidates are Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Herzegovinia, and Macedonia.

D. DEPTH OF THE ANALYSIS: HOW FAR BACK IS ENOUGH

Where should one begin an analysis of a region fraught with so many ancient antagonisms, slights, and triumphs, all held so close to the current social identity? Since East Central Europe is defined in this study as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the legacy of Yugoslavia, the narrative begins with 1919 - the first year in which all of those states existed as independent political entities at the same time, and in a cartographical form recognizable today. Any historical analysis of the East Central Europe which existed before 1919 is done only to establish what are arguably the two dominant themes guiding subsequent regional security development: the haphazard and violent nature surrounding the birth of the individual states, and tragedy extant in the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. Each theme has played a central role in the evolution of East Central Europe as both a buffer and a highway between hostile camps on either side, and neither theme has fully receded in importance with the end of the Cold War.

In confining the analysis to the seventy-three years dividing 1919 and the present day, one can distinguish within that period a number of natural divisions. Specifically (as already alluded to in the introduction), within a greater European security context, East Central Europe has survived three distinct phases since its inception. The first phase

began with the birth of East Central Europe - assured by Western support amidst imperial ruin and Bolshevik generation in 1919 - and ended with the Soviet occupation in 1945. The second phase began with the cementing of Soviet hegemony in the late 1940s, and ended only with the revolutions in 1989. The third phase began in 1989 with the reestablishment of nominally democratic regimes - again dependent on Western support - and will undoubtedly end at some undetermined time in the future.

E. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORY

At first glance, little seems to unite the natural divisions alluded to above. . The first security phase represented the last gasp of the international epoch defined by Great Power theory - the final crisis and collapse of the European Great Power system. The second security phase reflected the global divisions of a two superpower world so accurately predicted in the nineteenth century by de Toqueville - the triumph of America and Russia over the power of Europe. The third security phase is difficult to define, and may yet prove to be the expression of a single superpower paradigm - a Pax Americana - or a return to a Great Power system, but a Great Power system not confined to Europe.

What, then, unites these three natural divisions in the security environment in East Central Europe? Setting aside for a moment considerations of the third security phase, and

using the natural divisions expressed above, one can state clearly that from the First World War emerged a set of conditions which directly produced the long-term contest between Soviet Russia and the industrial West. Throughout this contest, the newly created states of East Central Europe served as the critical area, the buffer, the no-man's-land, first for the West (phase one), and then for the Soviets (phase two), against the spread of the deadly contagion carried by the other side. Indeed, ideology notwithstanding, the fear of contagion on the part of the hegemonic power was the central justification for a given East Central European security policy.²⁷ For twenty-six and forty-four years respectively, East Central Europe performed its role in the long-term contest effectively, halting the spread of Bolshevism into Europe, and capitalist bourgeois democracy into Russia.

This simple interpretation of events²⁸ reveals a number of pertinent assumptions. The first involves the issue of hegemony; the second, the concept of a hegemonic power; the third, the defining of a security phase by the hegemon-client relationship; and the fourth, the coalescence of hegemony within the analytical constructs of a monolithic East and a

²⁷In this way Woodrow Wilson with his concern for national self-determination, and Joseph Stalin - champion of the international Communist movement - resembled each other rather closely (not in the realm of activity, but in understanding of the threat).

²⁸The justification of which is the subject of chapter III.

definable and singular West. Regarding the issue of hegemony, no clear criteria exists for what defines a position of irresistible leverage and authority between one nation and another. Several candidates suggest themselves, and all have had a position in defining the various security phases in East Central Europe. On the part of the actor exerting hegemony - economic strength, military potential, military occupation, military guarantee against external threat, moral leadership and prestige, and political support for unpopular regimes - all influence, either singly or in combination, a hegemonic relationship. On the part of the actor subject to hegemonic influence, a particular vulnerability, again arising from economic, military, moral, and political factors, provides the first opening for a relationship marked by unequal leverage or authority.

Clearly these ingredients for a hegemon-client relation have been a traditional foundation upon which security arrangements have been based in East Central Europe. One analyst, describing the situation on the eve of the Second World War, characterized East Central Europe as, "a belt of small countries lying between Germany and Italy on the one side and Russia on the other: a buffer zone ... a line of states, which varied in size, but were all small and weak compared with the Great Powers on the west and east."²⁹ The

²⁹Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 206. (emphasis added)

sources of this weakness are the subject of subsequent discussion, but the results of this weakness, an evolving hegemon-client relationship, seems an undeniable byproduct of the East Central European position.

Concerning the concept of hegemonic power: in terms of the role, history, and prospects of East Central Europe within a greater European security context, both Russia (either Imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet) and the West function as singular entities. This analytical construct seems self-apparent with regard to Russian influence, but is less so when applied to so amorphous an idea as the West. Although either political circumstances or competition between individual actors within the West (in its broadest sense Western Europe and the Atlantic community) have at times produced different spokesmen, those individual spokesmen have been symbols of de facto policy coherence with regard to East Central Europe.

For example, in 1919 the West was represented by the wishes of the Big Four at the Paris Peace Conference acting through the policy instruments of American moral prestige, money, and food, and French military power. By the 1920s, American retreat into isolation and British indifference allowed the West to be represented by French interests acting through the policy instruments of political alliance and military guarantee. By the mid 1930s, French economic protectionism allowed the West to be represented by Germany through the economic policy instrument. With the coming of

the Cold War, the dislocations of the Second World War allowed the West to be represented by the United States using the policy instruments of economic aid, military alliance, moral authority, and nuclear guarantee. What will represent the West with respect to East Central Europe in the future is unclear, but American military withdrawal may allow Germany, either singly or acting in concert with others of her West European neighbors, to retake the role of spokesman using a variety of policy instruments.³⁰

Given this analytical construct, the proposed model argues that the respective failures of either Russia or the West as hegemonic power with regard to East Central Europe stem from significant fractures (either political, economic, or military) within either monolithic camp. When German expansionist desires made her an unacceptable spokesman for Western policy, conflict resulted, and Soviet Russia replaced the West as the hegemonic power in East Central Europe.³¹

Concerning the defining of a security phase by the hegemon-client relationship: the historical circumstances in which the hegemon status has been conferred first on the West, then on Russia, and now on the West again have marked major turning points in the international order in general, and on the social context within East Central Europe in particular.

³⁰A speculation which is reserved for the final chapter of this study.

³¹The collapse of the first and second security phases is the subject of chapter III.

In each of the three security phases suggested, East Central Europe has been a remarkably different place within which to live, and within which to conduct security policy. Consistent to these great changes has been the transference of hegemon status between Russia and the West.

This investigation centers around a pattern involving the relationship between five variables and the hegemonic power of a particular security phase in East Central Europe (first the West, then the Soviets, and now the West again): the perception by the hegemonic power of the threat facing it, the plan formulated by the hegemonic power with regard to East Central Europe to counter the threat, the activities proceeding from the plan (particularly in the current context, where activity serves as a guide in the absence of an overtly stated program), the evolving internal weaknesses of the hegemonic power, and the role of East Central Europe as a catalyst in those evolving weaknesses. The matching amongst the three security phases of this variable/hegemon relationship serves to illuminate better current roles and prospects not clarified by comprehensive, authoritative international policy documents, as well as to indicate the future prospects of East Central Europe within a Western-dominated, post-Cold War security arrangement.

As an analytical construct, this model proposes the role of East Central Europe within a larger European security arrangement as the outcome variable (or central puzzle), the

presence of a hegemonic power guiding such security arrangements as a constant, and the five relationships cited as the independent variables, or proof of the proposed argument. The first three independent variables reflect the creation of a specific role for East Central Europe within a particular security phase, and correspond to the three initial steps of the generic strategy process: determining security objectives, formulating grand strategy, and apportioning the proper policy instruments to the conduct of grand strategy.³²

The final two independent variables are more arbitrary, reflect the process of decline endemic to the end of a particular security phase, and proceed more from the research surrounding this analysis than from any preconceived analytical construct.

F. HYPOTHESIS

The collapse of Soviet power, the resulting end of the long-term contest, and the arrival of Western hegemony have not ended the traditional role for East Central Europe, but have only made it less apparent - less defined as the threat perceived by the hegemonic power has become less defined.

Both the arrival of Marxism in Eastern Europe in 1945 (destruction of phase one) and the surging of Western-style democracy in 1989 (destruction of phase two) occurred through

³²Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy, an Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), 14-17.

a process of moral collapse in the heart of the respective contestants, not through ineffectiveness of the East Central European buffer per se. In both cases, however, East Central Europe played a significant role as either a catalyst or accelerator of this internal weakness of the hegemonic power (in a sense acting as a highway rather than a buffer). East Central Europe continues to serve a traditional security role for a new hegemonic power. Accordingly, future prospects hinge less on activity in Russia (at the far side of the buffer), and more within the internal workings of the West - within potential internal weaknesses subject to acceleration by the East Central European political dynamic.

III. PYGMY BETWEEN TWO GIANTS

*"The War of the Giants has ended. The quarrels of the pygmies have begun."*³³

The purpose of the second chapter is to establish the two themes permeating security affairs in East Central Europe from 1919 to the present day: the factor of violent, haphazard birth, and the influence of Bolshevik triumph adjacent to East Central European borders. The unfortunate juxtaposition of these two factors created two mutually exclusive security conditions within East Central Europe: the requirement that East Central Europe exist as a buffer, balanced against internal regional factors which tended to mitigate against the effectiveness of that buffer once in place.

A. CONTEXT: IMPERIAL DECLINE AND VIOLENT BIRTH

The astonishing thing is that for so long there was no East Central Europe. There were, of course, imperial provinces, coal mines and breadbaskets for far-off capitals, sources of fodder for greater ambitions, and breeding grounds of ethnic pride and stunted desires. But there was no East Central Europe; it was subsumed by a zeal intent upon eradication and annexation into larger bodies, so that by 1914

³³Remark by Winston Churchill to Lloyd George upon the defeat of Germany in 1918. Lincoln, B., Red Victory, 1989, p.397.

the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires were, more or less, firmly in control. With the decline of the Ottomans, however, East Central Europe violently came into being - a Balkan orphan both desirable and beyond suppression. The Ottoman mother, as well as her attending imperial midwives, failed to survive the birth, so that by 1919 East Central Europe had become a fact to be reckoned with in the policy discussions of the industrial West.

The Southern Tier was the first to initiate this process, although exactly when is still open to question. Since its high tide at Vienna in 1630, the Ottoman Empire had been in a military decline compounded by internal political turmoil. By 1908 this process began to accelerate with the coming of the Young Turk revolution, and the fall of the Ottoman Sultan.³⁴ Although considered progressive, many of the new leaders had been recruited from the Ottoman army, and had had for their

³⁴Like so many important events, the Young Turk revolution was sparked by an accident. Within the Empire of Sultan Abdul Hamid, a number of secret political societies had sprung up in response to the atmosphere of political intolerance. Because of the effectiveness of the secret police in quelling such groups in Constantinople, the focal point of much of this secret political activity was in the then Ottoman port of Salonika. A fertile breeding ground for recruits to these societies was in the Ottoman Third Army responsible for policing the disintegrating situation in Macedonia. One of these groups was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), also known as the Young Turk Party, and one of its members was a young army officer named Enver.

In 1908, Enver was recalled to Constantinople. Fearing that his role in the CUP had been discovered, Enver took to the hills around Salonika. Soon other officers joined him, bringing their troops with them. An Ottoman column sent by the Sultan to quell the insurrection joined the rebels. Within a year, this ad hoc revolution had caused the abdication of the Sultan, the restoration of the constitution, parliament, and political parties. The Young Turks became the power behind the new Ottoman government. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, (New York: Avon Books, 1989), 39-41.

formative experiences the project of policing the Empire's crumbling European holdings. The new government was not inclined to be progressive about assimilation within the Empire, and soon sponsored a crackdown on Greek Orthodox Christians in particular, and on ethnic diversity in general.³⁵

This newly invigorated repression paid immediate dividends for the new Ottoman leadership, as Bulgaria declared independence in 1908, Crete formally united with an independent Greece in 1912, and Albania gained independence in 1913.³⁶ Concurrent with these new national formations were a series of crises, again issuing from Ottoman decline and important to the formation of the Southern Tier of East Central Europe. Austria exploited the confusion of the Young Turk revolution to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908,³⁷

³⁵David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 36-37, 40-41, 43.

Joseph R. Strayer, Hans W. Gatzke, and E. Harris Harbison, The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 2nd ed., (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974), 690.

³⁶These new players joined the already independent East Central European states of Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece.

³⁷This was a formal move. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had administered Bosnia and Herzegovina on behalf of the Ottomans since 1878.

After defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Russian ambition had directed itself westward. The principal ambition of Russian foreign policy was the opening of the Turkish Straits for Russian warships. Russian policy found a sympathetic ear in the Austrian foreign ministry. A secret meeting was conducted in 1908 between the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Izvolsky, and his Austrian counterpart, Count Aehrenthal. What resulted was the Buchlau Agreement of 1908, in which Austria was pledged to support Russian plans with regard to the Turkish Straits, and Russia was pledged to support Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Unfortunately, Austria began annexation without consultation, and before Russia was ready to move on the Straits. Russia was understandably concerned by this breach of the secret protocol. Joseph R. Strayer, et al. The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 690-691.

and in so doing incurred the anger of Russia and Russia's Balkan client, Serbia.³⁸ Russia requested on behalf of Serbia an international conference among the Great Powers to settle the dispute, but retreated in the face of German support of the Austrian position. Russia, ill-prepared to oppose Germany, convinced a bitter Serbia to accept the status quo.³⁹

The Bosnian Crisis was but the first of several events which shaped the formation of the Southern Tier. In 1911, hard on the heels of the Moroccan Crisis and with the full support of the other Great Powers, Italy annexed Tripoli and began the Tripolitanian War with the Ottoman Empire. The circumstances surrounding this war encouraged the Balkan states to pursue their own ambitions with reference to the remaining Ottoman holdings in Europe. Toward this end, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro formed the Balkan League in 1912, and soon after invaded Ottoman holdings. This First Balkan War resulted in the Treaty of London, signed in

³⁸Developing Serbian nationalism had been greatly influenced by the Russian ideology of pan-Slavism, but with an important twist: rather than a collection of European slavs under the benevolent leadership of Russia, Serbia envisioned a collection of South Central European slavs under the benevolent leadership of Serbia. Put more bluntly, Serbia had her own plans for annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was bitterly disappointed that those plans had been preempted by the Austrians. Joseph Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 691. Also, Frank H. Simonds, History of the World War, Vol. 1, (New York: Doubleday Page & Company, 1917), 40.

³⁹Joseph R. Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 691. David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace, 45. Frank H. Simonds, History of the World War, Vol. 1, 26-29.

May 1913, which divested the Ottoman Empire of European territories apart from Eastern Thrace.⁴⁰

The London Conference which had produced the treaty resulted from Great Power intervention in the War aims of the Balkan League. When the League was formed, Serbia was promised from the spoils access to the Adriatic through annexation of northern Albania.⁴¹ Serb ambitions with regard to slavs still under Hapsburg rule, as well as the Serbian special relationship with Russia, caused the Austrians and Italians to protest Serbian access under the cause of a free and independent Albania. This cause of Albanian independence was taken up by the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey. Once again, Serbia was forced to back down.⁴²

Her ambitions in Albania thus frustrated, Serbia turned to the newly acquired Bulgarian gains for compensation.⁴³ This compensation Bulgaria was unwilling to provide. This unwillingness to compromise was unfortunate, because shortly afterwards Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey declared war on Bulgaria. The Second Balkan War ended with

⁴⁰Joseph R. Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 692. David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace, 45. Frank H. Simonds, History of the World War, 32-34.

⁴¹Remembering of course, that Albania had not yet achieved independence.

⁴²Frank H. Simonds, History of the Great War, 34-35.

⁴³Specifically, the Vardar Valley in Macedonia.

the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913, in which Greece and Serbia acquired the bulk of Macedonia.⁴⁴

The final chapter in the formation of the Southern Tier prior to the First World War involved Serbian claims, subsequent to the Treaty of Bucharest, on Albanian territory. In this ambition Serbia was supported by Russia and opposed by Austria. Austria proposed a military intervention in Serbia, and was restrained from this course by Germany. Italy also continued to oppose Serbian access to the Adriatic, as did the British, who were by this time enamored by the justice of Albanian independence. In the face of such concerted opposition, Russia once again backed away from Serbian claims. The immediate result was a Serbian hatred for Austria, and for Austria, a deep distrust of Serbian intentions.⁴⁵

In July 1914, this equation was confirmed by the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, and the subsequently famous Austrian ultimatum.⁴⁶ The Balkan problem

⁴⁴Frank H. Simmonds, History of the Great War, 35-39. David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace, 45. Joseph R. Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 692.

⁴⁵Joseph R. Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 692-693.

⁴⁶The ultimatum, sent on July 23, 1917, prescribed censorship regulations with regard to anti-Austrian propaganda, specific measures to be taken against the propagandists themselves, the disbanding of anti-Austrian patriotic societies, and the punishment of society leaders irregardless of whether they were serving members of the Serbian government or military. Most galling for the Serbians was the requirement that these prescriptions be carried out by Austrian officials on Serbian soil. Compliance with the ultimatum was required within forty-eight hours of receipt. Frank H. Simmonds, History of the Great War, 49. Joseph R. Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 693.

subsequently insured that by August 1914, the wheels of international diplomacy were slowly moving towards the Great War. It was from these circumstances of violent, haphazard, and ethnically chauvinistic origin that the Southern Tier of the belt of small states which would come to be East Central Europe came into being.

Although the birth of the Southern Tier predated the Northern Tier by some four years, the circumstances of creation were not remarkably different, either in terms of haphazardness or international violence. Again, exactly where the process began is difficult to pinpoint, but the case of Poland provides a useful start. Poland lost her statehood in 1795, when the Third Partition distributed her remaining territory between the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian empires. Polish patriotism came to be defined roughly then, in terms of opposition to whatever empire controlled a given patriot's home; who one hated depended on where one lived. By the beginning of the First World War, patriotic political agitation was polarized by various factions who supported

Although the causes of the First World War are outside the scope of this study, results of the assassination are well known and worth recounting briefly. Serbia refused Austria's ultimatum; Austria, bolstered by German support (often called the 'blank check') prepared to invade Germany; Russia, in support of its Serbian ally, declared war on Austria; Germany declared war on Russia; France, an ally of Russia, declared war on Germany; Germany, in deference to the Schlieffen Plan, refused to guarantee Belgium neutrality; Great Britain, unwilling to see Great Power dominance of the Low Countries, declared war on Germany. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1962), 33-135.

different national objectives.⁴⁷ This polarization resulted in a policy of border alignments at the expense of both Germany and Soviet Russia.

The border adjustments at the expense of Germany were supported by Allied leadership at the Paris Peace Conference, but Polish claims in the east were received with less enthusiasm.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, German troops had withdrawn from

⁴⁷This factionalism was illustrated by the competition between Marshall Pilsudski's Leftist platform, and the more conservative program of his chief political rival, Roman Dmowski. Pilsudski had been born in Wilno (Vilnius), and considered Lithuania an integral part of historic Poland (as a contemporary biographer remarked, Pilsudski considered Wilno "a better Poland, a Lithuanian Poland."), and the reclaiming of Poland's eastern borderlands in Byelorussia and Ukraine as integral to establishing a modern Polish state. The greatest enemy of Poland was Russia, whether ruled by the Czar, the Bolsheviks, or the Whites. In this anti-Russian feeling Pilsudski had long experience: first as a political prisoner in Siberia from 1887-1892, then in exile in London from 1896-1905, then as an inmate in a Russian insane asylum (where he faked illness to escape greater punishment) from 1905-1908, and finally as a train robber in 1908 when he stole two-hundred and fifty thousand rubles to support Polish rebellion.

At the beginning of the War, Pilsudski's notoriety had not gained him any great political popularity in Poland; that belonged to his rival Dmowski. Dmowski was from the German portion of Poland, and fear of German ambition fueled his political vision. With the beginning of the War, Dmowski went into exile with the Allied governments, and at the time of the Paris Peace Conference was considered the legitimate chief of the Polish delegation. Pilsudski spent the war in command of the Polish Legion in the service of Germany. With the Russian Revolution in the spring of 1917, Pilsudski withdrew the Legion from fighting, had it interred, and was himself imprisoned by the Germans. This act on behalf of Polish nationalism gained Pilsudski enormous prestige, and while Dmowski was stuck in Paris, Pilsudski formed a Polish government in Warsaw with the collapse of German power on November 10, 1918. In the subsequent elections to the Constituent Assembly, Dmowski's party achieved a majority.

What this meant for Polish foreign policy and national formation was a desire for liberal border settlements in the West at Germany's expense (championed by the Constituent Assembly), and generous expansion eastward at Russia's expense (championed by Pilsudski). What resulted was the Polish-Soviet war, and the enmity of two temporarily weak Great Powers at Poland's frontiers. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, from Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold, eds., A History of East Central Europe, Vol. IX, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 45-46. And W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, A History of the Russian Civil War, (New York: A Touchstone Book, 1989), 398.

⁴⁸The Allies agreed that Poland's eastern boundary should be established at the Curzon Line, formed by the Bug River. W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 414.

the Oberkommando-Ostfront dividing Poland's eastern borderlands, and both Polish and Bolshevik troops moved in to fill the void. The resulting small unit clashes characterized the region under contention until April 1919, when Poland opted for invasion of Soviet territory.⁴⁹

The Polish invasion signalled the start of the Polish-Soviet War, and as such was the culmination of a number of serious political miscalculations. Polish leadership genuinely believed that the people of the border regions (particularly Lithuanians) wanted a restoration of historic Poland; such was not the case. Also, the Poles overestimated the damage that the World War and Revolution had visited on the Russian ability to fight, as well as the support that could be expected from the Allies for Polish objectives. Nonetheless, the Polish invasion met with great initial success, the high tide of which was the occupation of Kiev in early May 1919.⁵⁰

⁴⁹The opening incident of the Polish-Soviet war took place at the small village of Bereza Kartuska on February 14, 1919. At that time Bolshevik forces were arrayed all around the periphery of the former Russian Empire in conduct of the Civil War. Total Bolshevik forces in the West by April numbered forty-six thousand. Against them were two-hundred thousand Poles who would soon be supplemented by the return of the various Polish Legions which had fought for each of the former occupying empires. W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 399-400.

⁵⁰The Polish army captured Wilno on April 21, 1919, and Minsk and Lvov by that June. Peace negotiations were entered into with the Bolsheviks from October to December 1919. The Polish delegation walked away from the negotiations in December, and resumed the offensive into the Ukraine on April 25, 1920. Once again initial successes were good, as Polish forces advanced fifty miles in the first twenty-four hours. By May 7, Polish forces occupied Kiev. W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 401-409.

Initial Polish gains were quickly reversed however, first in late May and early June 1920, when the Bolsheviks reoccupied Kiev, and then especially in July when a general Bolshevik offensive was begun to trap Polish troops inside the Ukraine. By mid August, after a string of dramatic successes, Soviet forces were investing Warsaw.⁵¹ In crossing the Curzon Line into what the Paris Peace Conference considered to be Poland proper, the Soviet government encouraged greater Allied military support for the Polish cause.⁵² This Allied support, along with renewed White military efforts in southern Russia, allowed the Polish army to narrowly win the Battle of Warsaw in August, and to begin a process of territorial reclamation in September and October. Although Lithuania remained independent, Wilno was returned to Polish control by

⁵¹The two critical factors in the Soviet turnaround were the assignment of Mikhail Tukhachevskii, then only twenty-seven years old, as commander of the western forces (April 29, 1920), and the redistribution of forces, recently triumphant over Kolchak in Siberia and Denikin in the Donbass, to Tukhachevskii's command. The combination of adequate forces and at times brilliant leadership proved irresistible. In June Kiev was recaptured; In July, Soviet forces crossed the Berezina River, capturing Minsk on July 13 and Wilno on July 14 (the latter was assisted by the local Lithuanian population, which had finally been promised independence by the Bolshevik regime); Soon after, the Curzon Line was breached, and Brest-Litovsk taken. W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 409-415.

⁵²Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, delivered a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin which encouraged the Soviet government not to send troops west of the Bug River. Chicherin rejected Curzon's letter. As President of the Second Comintern Congress Zinoviev recalled, "the best representatives of the international proletariat ... all perfectly realized that, if the military aim of our army was achieved, it would mean an immense acceleration of the international proletarian revolution." W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 415.

mid October.⁵³ On October 12, 1920 an armistice was signed, and the war was finally concluded with the Treaty of Riga on March 22, 1921. Despite the tremendous Soviet successes in the spring and summer of 1920, by the end of the fighting Poland retained territorial borders one-hundred miles to the east of the Curzon Line.⁵⁴

Although benign by comparison, the situation in Poland's two southern neighbors was also marked by a certain shading of anarchy and armed violence. The Czechs were perhaps best positioned to take advantage peacefully of the imperial disintegration forming East Central Europe, and to a large degree they were able to do so.⁵⁵ With regard to Allied support for claims in the Hungarian controlled section of

⁵³To protect Allied sensibilities, which supported the cause of Lithuanian independence, a mock uprising was staged in Wilno, and that city turned itself over to Polish control. W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 419.

⁵⁴W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 414-420.

⁵⁵The Czech success in achieving most of their territorial aims short of violence was the product of the formidable negotiating talents of three Czech exiles: T.G. Massaryk, Eduard Benes, and Milan Stefanik. The Czech negotiating team sold the Allies a contradictory proposition: that Czechoslovakia should retain historic borders in opposition to the national claims of Sudeten Germans in Silesia and ethnic Poles in Silesia and Slovakia, and that Czechoslovakia should retain national borders in opposition to the historic claims of Hungary in Slovakia and Ruthenia. For strategic and economic reasons, the Allies quickly accepted the first proposition; the Allies were hesitant, however, in granting the second proposition. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Wars, 76-78.

In Poland, the same negotiating tactic was used. As one observer at the time explained, "a Polish diplomat expounded to me the very extensive (and mutually contradictory) territorial claims of his country, and I inquired on what principle they were based, he replied with rare frankness: 'On the historical principle, corrected by the linguistic wherever it works in our favor.'" L.B. Namier, "1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals," Raleigh Lecture on History, 1944, from the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXX, (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), 66, in Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," Arnold Toynbee, ed., The World in March 1939, (London: Oxford University Press 1952), 230.

Slovakia, Czech leaders thought to speed the process along by military occupation of the affected territory in May 1919. This thought proved a mistake, because it provoked an unsuccessful military campaign with the Hungarian Communist government of Bela Kun.⁵⁶

At war's end, Hungary planned to retain its historic borders and dominant position within those borders not by reform or compromise with its ethnic minorities, but by abandoning its treaty ties with Germany and its constitutional ties with Austria in the hope that a gullible West would see Hungary as the victim of Germanic repression.⁵⁷ The old regime was replaced in Budapest by a popular and bloodless uprising on October 31, 1918, and a reform government under Count Mihaly Karolyi came into power, too late, however, to stop the national dismemberment of Hungary's historic borders.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 147-148.

⁵⁷An example of Hungarian arrogance involved the Belgrade Armistice with Romania. Signed two days after the armistice in the West (November 13, 1918), the armistice ceded large tracks of Romanian territory to a dominant Hungary. Hungarian political leadership seemed unable to understand that imperial collapse would demand a change in attitude towards neighbors. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 139.

⁵⁸Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the World Wars, 139-140.

This process was momentarily arrested by the placement in power of Bela Kun's Hungarian Communist Party,⁵⁹ and the subsequent offensive against new Czech holdings in Slovakia in May 1920. By June, Hungarian forces held two-thirds of Slovakia, and had severed ground communications in Ruthenia between Czech and Romanian forces. The Allies were uncomfortable with the Hungarian success, and in mid June issued a series of ultimatums requiring that Hungarian forces evacuate virtually all of Slovakia. Initial Hungarian calculations had depended on both Russian communist military support, as well as spontaneous revolutionary uprisings in the West to cement territorial gains. When neither condition occurred, Kun was forced to accede to Allied wishes and withdraw his forces.⁶⁰

⁵⁹During the First World War, some five-hundred thousand Hungarian prisoners were interred in Russia. A certain fraction became politicized, and began fighting on behalf of the Reds in the Civil War. This fraction, at a conference in Moscow, formed the Hungarian Communist Party on November 4, 1918, and promptly sent two hundred agitators to Hungary to politicize the reform movement of Karolyi's regime. Three-hundred more were sent in March 1919. One of the first to go back (arriving in Budapest on November 16, 1918) was a former Hungarian journalist and leader of the new party, Bela Kun. Kun soon started a newspaper and began agitating among workers. Calls in the party newspaper for an uprising on February 3 and 6, 1919 resulted in Kun's arrest and imprisonment. The imprisonment served to martyr Kun, and cast the Karolyi regime in the repressive light of its predecessor.

Further unrest was fueled by the Allies reinterpreting the Belgrade Armistice to favor Romanian border claims. Kun strongly opposed any more concessions, and gained a following in the small republican army. Further Allied demands for border redrawing, the Vyx demarche of March 20, 1919, resulted in the fall of the Karolyi regime, and the merger of the socialist political leadership with Kun's Communist Party. On March 21, 1919, Kun came to power. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 143-145.

⁶⁰Because Kun had come to power largely through his opposition to border restructuring, capitulation to Allied demands forced his resignation and exile. The remnants of his government was left in Budapest to face the consequences of Communist rule. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 145-149.

Kun's successors, in a last ditch effort to secure public support, conducted an attack on Romania in July which only succeeded in disintegrating after three days. Unfortunately, internal conservative opposition used this opportunity to invite an invasion of Hungary by Romanian forces.⁶¹ The Romanians entered Budapest on August 4, 1919, and stayed until November 14 of the same year. During this time, the Romanians liquidated the remnants of the Kun regime, and thoroughly invested and raped the Hungarian capitol. Two days after the Romanians evacuated Budapest, the conservative administration formed at Szeged entered the city.⁶²

The Northern Tier, like its southern neighbor, was born of chaotic and violent circumstances. By the end of 1919, the imperial collapse had created in East Central Europe a band of nominally independent states which purported to represent both the current needs and historic aspirations of largely ethnically homogenous populations, but which were subject to the traditional power equations which mitigated against their previous existence. That the governments in place in East Central Europe often failed to represent current needs, exploited historic aspirations at the expense of neighbors,

⁶¹A group of conservative old regime members had retired to the southern university city of Szeged and had raised an army of sixteen-thousand under an Admiral Horthy. Rather than pit this force against the remaining supporters of the Communist regime, the Horthy group encouraged a Romanian invasion so that Romanian forces could eliminate leftist political opposition. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 152.

⁶²Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 152.

and only rarely resided over homogenous populations - all within a formative atmosphere of national passion and international violence - set in train the seeds of much which would follow.

The birth of East Central Europe was compounded by a tragic event adjacent to its borders: the triumph of Bolshevism and the formation of Soviet Russia. The ten days in October 1917 within which the Bolshevik coup took place unleashed on the world a theology, dedicated clerisy, and traditional power potential both hostile to Western democratic and social values, and threatening to Western security. As the Civil War in Russia expanded throughout 1919 and into 1920, and as Bolshevik defeat began to seem less and less likely, this fact of a hostile and threatening Soviet Russia - a Russia which, unbeknown to contemporary observers, would be destined to engage in a bitter seventy-four year contest with the West - weighed heavily on the minds of those chosen to fashion a lasting European security.

Within each of the security phases which were to follow, these unfortunate determinants of haphazard birth and dimly perceived long-term contest were to provide the foundation stone upon which alliances were forged and security structures were built.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The nations of East Central Europe - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary (the Northern Tier), Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the inheritors of Yugoslavia (the Southern Tier) - form a geographic barrier between Russia and the industrial West. Proceeding from a process of imperial disintegration, East Central Europe is the product of two defining realities: violent, chaotic, haphazard birth, and the formation of a Soviet state in ideological opposition to the industrial West. These two defining experiences have constrained the security prospects of East Central Europe to that of a buffer between East and West.

IV. AT THE CREATION

*"The path of the world conflagration passes over the corpse of Poland."*⁶³

The purpose of this chapter is to develop the circumstances surrounding the creation of the first and second security phases in East Central Europe, to examine the political calculations central to the deliberations of the respective policy makers, and to analyze those factors common to each phase.

A. 1919: EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST SECURITY PHASE

The armistice which ended the fighting of the First World War in November 1918 signalled the end of a Great Power system which had regulated international affairs since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. At Vienna, what a later observer would call, "the misguided, the reactionary, the after all pathetic aristocrats," of that time conducted negotiations for a new system in secret and from a philosophy of 'compensations' and 'transference of souls', reducing the affected populations to

⁶³Remark made by Mikhail Tukhachevskii during the fighting of the Polish-Soviet War. W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 402.

TABLE I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN BUFFER

	Eastern Europe	Russia	West
1917		cordon sanitaire	revolution
1929- 1939	moral collapse		
1939- 1945		German control	WWII
1945- 1949		satelitization	
1975- 1989			moral collapse
1989		revolutions	
1989- 1992		cordon sanitaire	
post- 1992	moral collapse?		resurgence?

the status of pawns on the Great Power chessboard.⁶⁴ Such was not the atmosphere of the Allied delegations who proceeded to Paris after the armistice to fashion a peace consistent with the sacrifices of the war.

In broad terms, the delegations which gathered at Paris wished to end the fighting still ongoing in the wake of imperial collapse (to stabilize a chaotic situation), to define the status of the vanquished powers, to attack what

⁶⁴Harold Nicolson was a member of the British delegation which embarked for the Paris Peace Conference at the end of 1918. His is perhaps one of the best first hand accounts of the emotional and perceptual flavor of the proceedings. Peacemaking 1919, (New York: the University Library, Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), 31.

were perceived as the systemic and underlying causes which had led to the fighting, to fashion a new international structure which would prevent a relapse in the future, and finally, to overcome any ongoing problems which could be perceived as an obstacle to such an international structure. A member of the British delegation, Harold Nicolson, summed up his feelings on the eve of the conference:

We were journeying to Paris, not merely to liquidate the war, but to found a new order in Europe. We were preparing not Peace only, but Eternal Peace. ... We thought less about our late enemies than about the new countries which had arisen from their tired loins. Our emotions centered less around the old than around the new. ... the concepts 'Germany,' 'Austria,' 'Hungary,' 'Bulgaria,' or 'Turkey' were not on the forefront of our minds. It was the thought of the new Serbia, the new Greece, the new Bohemia, the new Poland which made our hearts sing hymns at heaven's gate. ... Bias there was, and prejudice. But they proceeded, not from any revengeful desire to subjugate and penalize our late enemies, but from a fervent aspiration to create and fortify the new nations whom we regarded, with maternal instinct, as the justification of our sufferings and of our victory.⁶⁵

Put another way, the Allied delegations approached Paris from a particular world view which wished to right what were perceived as past wrongs, and which then wished to move on to an active strategy for the future.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, 31-33. (emphasis added)

⁶⁶This in no way means to imply that all of the Big Four (Britain, France, the United States, and Italy) held the same world view, or for that matter any greater policy agreement. In particular, France wanted to punish Germany far more than the other Allies, and the particulars of the final settlement were the subject of intense negotiation. What can be said with some accuracy, is that the flavor of the Conference was shaped by the ideology of Woodrow Wilson, and that the unique popular prestige of Wilson in Europe dictated that the Peace would be conducted at least within the

Concerning those problems which were perceived as an obstacle to the founding of the new order, how did Allied leadership at Paris in 1919 fashion strategy, particularly with regard to the role of East Central Europe?⁶⁷

An entire generation of current observers, regardless of political outlook, has been conditioned by the seventy-five year reality of Soviet Russia to take Marxism-Leninism seriously - both as a belief system, political philosophy, and operating method of government. Soviet statehood has forced policy analysts to examine Communism on its merits; to critically analyze the intricacies of the dialectic, and to

guidelines of Wilsonian principles, in particular the Fourteen Points. Wilson proved difficult to resist for other reasons: in particular, the publication of the secret treaties by the Central Executive Committee of the Communist government in Moscow on November 22, 1917 had distilled Allied war aims to a callous calculation of Great Power politics. Although the secret treaties were embarrassing in and of themselves, they were even more dangerous for the Allied governments in that they failed to justify to the various electorates the slaughter which had taken place by 1917. Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, 1917-1924, (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 8-9.

The secret treaties themselves involved territorial compensation to Italy for joining the Allies, territorial concessions to Romania and Greece, the partition of Turkey, control of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits by Russia, a plan by France and Russia to redraw German borders, and an almost fantastic secret conference between French, British, and German bankers to compensate Germany territorial losses in the West with Russian territory in the East. James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918, Documents and Materials, Hoover War Library Publications - No.3, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), 242.

Contrast these cynical arrangements to the Four Principles which guided Wilson's Fourteen Points, and one understands the power that Wilson had over public opinion: "(1) 'Each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case.' (2) 'Peoples and provinces must not be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were chattels or pawns in a game.' (3) 'Every territorial settlement must be in the interests of the populations concerned; and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states.' (4) 'All well defined national elements shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord and antagonism.'" Harold Nicolson, Peace Making 1919, 40-41.

⁶⁷Particularly with regard to the broad strategy process already mentioned: determining security objectives, formulating a grand strategy, and application of appropriate policy instruments.

intellectually accept or dismiss those intricacies.⁶⁸ Such was not the case for the policy makers who assembled at Paris in 1919 to assess the threat of Bolshevism - the great unresolved issue at the conference.⁶⁹ British Prime Minister Lloyd George felt strongly that:

Bolshevik imperialism does not merely menace the states on Russia's borders. It threatens the end of Asia and is near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think the Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace it may have arranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as it is today.⁷⁰

Active Western opposition to Bolshevism had originally occurred within a wartime context, and was subject to all of the distortions and propaganda excess such a context implied.⁷¹

⁶⁸Which is to say that practical application goes furthest to distinguish Marxism from the long and respected line of Western utopian philosophers. Famous examples include Sir Thomas More's Utopia, from The Works of Sir Thomas More, 1557, as well as the works of the prominent socialist utopians of the nineteenth century: Count Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, and Louis Blanc. Joseph R. Strayer, et al, The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 386, 585-586.

⁶⁹Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919, 1967, p.285.

⁷⁰Comment made in a memorandum of March 25, 1919. E. Malcom Carroll, Soviet Communism and Western Opinion 1919-1921, Frederic B.M. Hollyday, ed., (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 4.

⁷¹The contemporary view of a German Empire five-thousand miles in width seems rather quaint in light of the previous forty-five years of Soviet-American superpower dominance; it was less so to those at the time, especially when one keeps in mind that one-hundred million Europeans directly ruled four-hundred million in the assorted colonies and dominions, that Great Britain, for example, had just concluded fifteen years previously a war on the Cape of Africa under the imperial slogan "from Capetown to Cairo," which served to guarantee access to a British-controlled Indian subcontinent, and for that matter that the entire continent of Africa had been divided among the Great Powers in the short period from 1876 to 1912. Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa - the White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912, (New York: Random House, 1991), xxi-xxv.

The Bolshevik threat did not recede with the Armistice, however, in part because Western perceptions of the nature of the Bolshevik threat had become more crystallized - more clearly in tune with possible domestic political implications. These domestic implications revolved around the fear and distaste of what was seen as a growing conglomeration of spreading revolution, sanctioned illegality, and repressive tyranny.⁷² Bolshevism was less an idea to be feared in

Accordingly, Western policy maker feared Bolshevik gestures which seemed consistent with German victory. In light of WWII realities, this Bolshevik-German link also seems strange, except that the Germans had introduced Lenin into Petrograd with the understanding that he would remove Russia from the War. "The aims of the Imperial Government and of the left wing of the Russian revolutionaries coincided to a high degree. The willingness of this government to grant favors may have, on occasions, exceeded the willingness of the revolutionaries to accept them. ... A socialist revolution was the (Bolsheviks') aim. To achieve and further it they were prepared to use every means." Z.A.B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915-1918, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), x-xi, 25-35. Once in Russia, the Bolsheviks did everything in their power to weaken the Imperial Army, hasten the German advance, and thus topple the regime in power. Richard Orland Atkinson "Watching the Russian Army Die," Harper's Magazine, October 1918, 618-631.

The public flavor of the times is perhaps best expressed by such contemporary New York Times editorials as "Surrender Russia and Lose the War," in which the following phrases can be found: "Berlin to Tokio! Nothing less is involved in the swift absorption by Germany of Russia," and "...we shall be giving Russia over to Germany. and to give Russia over to Germany means to give the future of the human race over to Germany." 3 June 1918, p.10:1. Another example in the New York Times is an article by American war photographer Donald C. Thompson titled: "Lenine Anti-American as Well as Pro-German." 18 November 1917, p.8:1.

These press perceptions were mirrored by government policy makers, and were not helped by the incredible level of incompetence by Western reporters and officials in Russia. For a good description of this incompetence, see Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: from Crimea to Vietnam: the War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich, 1975), 137-170.

War-time fears prompted a series of Allied interventions on Russian soil, ostensibly to protect Allied supplies from the Germans, which by 1919 involved three-hundred thousand Western troops. Details of the intervention can be found in W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 163-193.

⁷²Of the three, by far the most dangerous, and thus the idea that garnered the most consensus from the Big Four at Versailles, was revolution. This fear was compounded by the fact of active (although at the time, not Marxist) revolutions in China and Mexico. Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933, 1984, 32-33. The revulsion at illegality was peculiar to Wilson, but important because of American post-War financial strength. Wilson

philosophic repose (in a way that a later generation would fear Godless Communism), but rather (because of its appeal to the potential disaffected within domestic working populations), in action - a violent, irrational, anarchic, lashing spasm to be contained quickly by an emotionally exhausted West concerned with rational, ordered legality.

Of grave concern to Western leadership was the headless transmission mechanism of this dangerous Bolshevik idea, with its ability to bypass (or for that matter to infect) armies and governments.⁷³ Whole societies were vulnerable if not shielded. Furthermore, Western leaders feared the Bolshevik idea for its potential, for its ability to grow into a

believed in the political realm as civilized man's highest activity, and the rule of law as its proper expression. Lenin's decree of 22 November 1917 which effectively outlawed law (and replaced it with "revolutionary consciousness") was an example of the sort of Bolshevik measure that Wilson equated with social anarchy. Pipes, D., The Russian Revolution, 1990, p.797, and Mayer, pp.19-22. The fear of tyranny was consonant with Wilson's Fourteen Points and a just completed war to save democracy. As the structure of Eastern Europe was solidified over the next couple of years, the inherent inconsistency between the forces of social anarchy (revolution and illegality) and the forces of autocracy became more and more difficult to reconcile, and Western planners increasingly began to support the latter.

Wilson's views of Bolshevism were supported by Senator Lodge (isolationist head of the Foreign Relations Committee) who characterized the Bolsheviks as a band of "anthropoid apes," whose brand of anarchy, if "permitted to spread through Western Civilization," would cause "that Civilization to fall." quoted in Mayer, p.334, from Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, Senate, December 21, 1918.

⁷³This fear was far from groundless. The Bolsheviks themselves fully expected that the Russian Revolution would set off similar upheavals in the rest of Europe, particularly in Germany, and that a belt of socialist states would be formed. The formations of Soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria in 1919 was assisted by Moscow through the Second Comintern. Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 43-47. Also Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1971, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), 111-125.

central, rather than peripheral concern.⁷⁴ Regarding the view of Bolshevism held by many Americans in particular,

The Bolsheviks ... were consistently characterized ... as idealistic to the point of fanaticism; as doctrinaire, impractical, irresponsible, naive. ... It was not as communists that they were approved of or despised ... References to Bolshevik 'tyranny' ... were referring to the tyranny of 'the mob.'⁷⁵

All this is not to say that the Allies did not try to include some sort of Russian delegation within the confines of the Peace Conference, or to directly affect the events in Russia through means other than the armed intervention then taking place, and it was only after exhausting a number of different initiatives that the course subsequently embarked upon was chosen.⁷⁶

⁷⁴There was some debate over how best to counter Bolshevism's threat to the West. Central to this debate was the perception of transmission mechanism. Herbert Hoover in a letter to Woodrow Wilson concerning the Nansen Plan for humanitarian food aid stated the problem succinctly: "There remains ... one more point to be examined, that is whether the Bolshevik centers now stirred by great emotional hopes will not undertake large military crusades in an attempt to impose their doctrines on other defenseless people. ... it seems ... that the whole treatment of the problem must revolve on the determination of this one question." dated March 28, 1919. Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, pp.25-26. John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp.39-50.

⁷⁵Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 128-131.

⁷⁶The Allied delegations pursued five different initiative toward solving the Russian problem at the Paris Peace Conference. First, invitations were extended to the warring factions to meet at a conference on Prinkipo Island in the Sea of Marmara. Secondly, Winston Churchill tried to increase Allied involvement in the intervention so as to soften the Bolshevik position. Thirdly, William C. Bullitt, secret diplomatic agent on behalf of the British and American governments was sent on a mission to Moscow to talk to the Bolshevik leadership. Fourth, Herbert Hoover planned to coerce the Bolsheviks through the offering of food as part of the Nansen Plan. And finally, the Allies tried to politically unite the various White factions under an umbrella of Western liberal democracy. All of these initiatives failed. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West, 121-122.

Western understanding of the essential political nature of the threat produced a three-pronged plan of limited and brief military activity, broad political support for nominally democratic regimes, and social/technical assistance to combat adverse living conditions. Military activity can be dismissed rather quickly, because it lasted the least amount of time, produced the greatest opposition among domestic electorates, and furnished the most meager results.⁷⁷ The overall plan (halting and ad hoc as it was) came to be known as the policy of *cordon sanitaire*.

The political component of *cordon sanitaire* demanded Western support for a series of East Central European regimes newly formed around Wilsonian national principles, and Western animosity to an old international order which Wilson in particular considered a source of Bolshevik discontent ("a protest against the way the world had worked"⁷⁸). By far the

⁷⁷At the height of the intervention, the Americans had ten-thousand troops on Russian soil (almost equally split between the Archangel and Siberian fronts), the British had one-hundred and forty-thousand troops (mostly in the Baku and Caspian Sea area), and the French had one-hundred and fifty-thousand troops (spread out in Poland, the Ukraine, and the Crimea). These forces were hampered by several things, most noticeably the unexpected efficiency of the Reds, the incompetence of the Whites, the desire (particularly in Britain and France) to bring the troops home at the end of the war, and a series of military mutinies (particularly among the British and French troops in south Russia). W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 163-193, Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 602-603, Philip Knightly, The First Casualty, 138-139.

Some policy makers never lost their enthusiasm for the prospects of intervention, principal among them being newly appointed Secretary for War Winston Churchill. Churchill believed that twenty-thousand dedicated and aware men were sufficient for the elimination of the Bolsheviks.

⁷⁸Statement from Wilson to his staff while aboard the S.S. George Washington in transit to France. Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 21.

strongest element of cordon sanitaire involved concerted remedial efforts against the social underpinnings of potential Bolshevik sympathy. American Secretary of State Robert Lansing succinctly stated the policy objective: "full stomachs mean no Bolsheviks."⁷⁹

Although effective in containing the Bolshevik virus, this policy of cordon sanitaire had unfortunate side-effects for the fate of East Central Europe in general, and American ratification of the Versailles Treaty in particular. Western leaders were forced to acquiesce to many of the territorial claims of the new states, particularly with regard to frontiers taken at the expense of a weakened Russia. The two linchpin states, Poland and Romania, made demands that ensured overextension and long-term resentments.⁸⁰ Only by satisfying a certain portion of the various nationalist

⁷⁹Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 41.

Wilson attacked the social cause of Bolshevism with Herbert Hoover and the American Relief Administration (ARA). Ostensibly a non-political organization, the ARA assumed almost dictatorial powers over the old imperial transportation infrastructures of Eastern Europe. Hoover and his men insured that all U.S. shipments of grain had prominent American markings - that the local population was under no illusion that the West, and not Bolshevism, was the proper course of salvation. Furthermore, the ARA acted overtly to topple Bolshevik regimes, most notably by increasing aid to Poland during its campaign against Russia in 1920, and by elimination of aid to Bela Kun's Hungarian Bolshevik regime during its brief life and war with Rumania.

So concerned were Hoover and Wilson over this relationship between food and Bolshevism that they acted to subvert the Anglo-French blockade of Germany. Britain wished to maintain the blockade as a sure guarantee of German acquiescence to the Versailles settlement. The French had a more byzantine design, hoping to use the lure of food to prompt the succession of various German principalities and regions, thus returning Germany to a pre-1871 status. Such was the threat of Bolshevism, that Wilson thwarted these designs. Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 37-55.

⁸⁰Polish acquisition of the eastern borderlands had already been examined. Romania was in the process of annexing Bessarabia (modern day Moldavia). "Decree of the Council of People's Commissars breaking relations with Romania," in Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 40.

ambitions could the West hope to produce popular regime legitimacy so important in the face of a threat which did not move with the path of armies. Unfortunately, once the merger of political and armed threat was accomplished, the new regimes were in a poor geopolitical position to counter.⁸¹

A second unfortunate side effect of the concessions granted to the cordon was the permanent codifying of these border arrangements under Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article X was essentially a compromise between Wilson's world view (so succinctly stated in the Four Principles), and the necessity to stabilize East Central Europe in the face of growing anarchic decay. Article X effectively made illegal subsequent claims for border readjustments, and pandered to the national sentiment of states which had advanced through the treaty (such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania), while incurring the enmity of those which had not (such as Germany, Russia, and Hungary). The real flaw of this compromise made in favor of stability

⁸¹Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918-1919, 340-341, 602-603.

Because the Versailles system which emerged dated from the revolutions of 1918 which preceded the conference, the system could be said to have "been created from below by a single overmastering political impulse, that of nationalism." The Versailles Treaty of 28 June 1919 concerned only Germany, and affected East Central Europe only so far as it dictated Germany's eastern borders. A series of what were called 'suburban' treaties gave legal form to the new system in East Central Europe: the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919 with Austria; the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of November 27, 1919 with Bulgaria; the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920 with Hungary; and the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923 with Turkey. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 226.

Subsequent debate in the U.S. Senate over the Versailles Treaty really centered around the associated Covenant of the League of Nations.

(demanded by the requirements of cordon) over principle, was that it became a critical stumbling block to Treaty ratification in the American Senate (was, in fact, the most contentious issue in that debate). Failure get American ratification deprived the cordon of its most powerful patron within the West, and placed its security fate in the hands of a France that in the coming years would prove to be less and less able to provide a believable security guarantee.⁸²

The creation of the first security phase in East Central Europe was dominated by the threat of Bolshevism and, subsequently, by a grand strategy which required "the delimiting of an eastern frontier for Eastern Europe over against (a) Russia (which) was at that time considered a greater danger to Europe than defeated Germany."⁸³ Western leadership analyzed Bolshevism as principally an internal domestic threat (instead of an external military threat), dangerous because of its translation of ideology into violent, anarchic, revolutionary action. This threat could best be contained by shielding Western societies behind a series of buffer states in Eastern Europe which would at the same time function as a barrier to Soviet Russia and as a counterweight

⁸²For discussions involving the ratification battle, see Alice R. Craemer, "Peace - 1921," Current History, February 1946, 138-139. Elihu Root, "Letter to Honorable Will H. Hayes Regarding the Covenant of the League of Nations," American Journal of International Law, March 1922, 591-593. Arthur S. Link, "Wilson and the Great Debate over Collective Security," in Arthur S. Link, ed., The Impact of World War I, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 129-147.

⁸³Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 240.

to a weakened Germany. Within this series of buffer states, the two central actors of the cordon sanitaire were Poland and Romania.⁸⁴

Several separate policies made the cordon sanitaire possible. The first involved political support for the national aspirations of the affected regimes. This support issued forth from the Western Allies, who, alone as the dominant military survivors of the war, were given the project of drawing the map of Europe and codifying the results. Secondly, the use of food relief as a blunt instrument by the Americans encouraged the survival of regimes sympathetic to the role of cordon, while condemning regimes hostile to containment of Bolshevism.⁸⁵ Thirdly, the continued support of the French in the face of American political isolation and British indifference, insured a continued orientation towards the cordon role. French maintenance of the cordon sanitaire was guaranteed by treaties of friendship and alliance with

⁸⁴The Polish conquest of East Galicia had resulted in a common frontier with Romania. In 1921, Poland and Romania signed a mutual security alliance against Russia which was to last until the outbreak of the Second World War. "Together the two Powers, one a Baltic state and the other a Danubian and Black Sea state, held the neck of Europe against the Bolshevik menace from the east." Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 241.

⁸⁵Specifically, the ARA's conduct during the Romanian-Hungarian conflict in 1919 contributed greatly to eliminating any remaining legitimacy of Kun's successor regime. In general, the fact that Hoover's ARA was meticulous in ensuring that starving populations understood that America aid alone was responsible for the relief effort went a long way towards promoting Western values (sold as a root cause of Western performance) over the values of Bolshevism.

Poland in 1921, Czechoslovakia in 1924, the Locarno Pact in 1925,⁸⁶ Romania in 1926, and Yugoslavia in 1927.

The Versailles system which was emplaced in East Central Europe in 1919 was the result of a broad strategy process which determined security goals in relation to the threat of Bolshevism, formulated grand strategy through the cordon sanitaire, and conducted this grand strategy through a variety of policy instruments, economic, political, and military. Effective with regard to its primary threat, the cordon sanitaire was fully realized by a series of treaties which, according to one analyst, "marked the high point of Eastern Europe as a political ridge or wall. Thenceforth it was subject to steady ... erosion, unwittingly preparing for German expansion ten years later."⁸⁷

B. 1945: STALIN, EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE SECOND SECURITY PHASE

At the conclusion of the Second World War, his Red Army firmly in possession of most of Eastern Europe, Stalin alone among the Allies who had fought against Germany was positioned to dictate the security structures which would dominate the

⁸⁶The Locarno Pact was the first step in the weakening of the Versailles system in East Central Europe. A distinction was made between Germany's western frontier, which was multilaterally guaranteed by France, Belgium, Britain, Italy, and Germany, and Germany's eastern frontier, which was not guaranteed by Britain. British reticence implied that the German-Polish border was less sacrosanct, and thus put into question all of the agreements guaranteed by Article X of the League Covenant. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 247.

⁸⁷Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 247.

post-war world in East Central Europe.⁸⁸ In this position Stalin was confirmed by numerous Allied war councils, beginning first with Teheran in November 1943, then with Yalta in February 1945⁸⁹, and finally with Potsdam in July 1945.⁹⁰

⁸⁸For this end, the Red Army had expended a great deal of effort. Beginning in the summer of 1944, much of Soviet military strategy was oriented towards post-war political desires. In August 1944, Romania switched sides and declared war on Germany. Despite this gesture, the Red Army subsequently occupied the entire country. In September 1944, Bulgaria, which had been neutral towards Russia, tried to sue the Americans and British for peace terms. On September 6, the Russians declared war on Bulgaria, and occupied it before an arrangement could be made with the West. Subsequently, the Red Army became involved in the very costly battle for Hungary, and especially for Budapest. In all of these efforts, Soviet forces would have been better served by concentrating in Poland towards the quick defeat of Germany. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 363-364.

⁸⁹Prior to Yalta, on October 9, 1944, Winston Churchill made a trip to Moscow to discuss the post-war settlement. Eager to limit Soviet gains, Churchill proposed an agreement on a series of spheres of influence. The percentages, calculated with no apparent basis in mind, guaranteed a Russian/British sphere of, respectively, 90/10 in Romania, 10/90 in Greece, 50/50 in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and 75/25 in Bulgaria. Churchill, who felt immediately guilty over this document which disposed of whole societies as pawns (in contrast to the lofty ideals of a previous generation of peacemakers), proposed that the incriminating document be burned. Stalin, who felt few such feelings, told Churchill to keep the document for himself.

The result of this geopolitical horse-trading was to practically guarantee for Stalin a dominant position in every country involved except Greece - either by giving to Soviet Russia the predominant percentage, or by being unable to overcome the influence of the Red Army occupation where the percentages were equal. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 364.

⁹⁰The central debate in each of these conferences concerned the status of Poland. Britain and France had gone to war over an alliance with Poland, and the Polish government in exile (the London Poles), as well as a significant number of Polish troops were fighting on behalf of the Allies. For these reasons Churchill said to Stalin at Yalta that for Britain, "Poland was a matter of honour: it was for Poland that Britain had drawn the sword against Hitler." Michael Charlton, The Eagle and the Small Birds - Crisis in the Soviet Empire: from Yalta to Solidarity, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 16.

Stalin, however, wanted any post-war Polish government to be run by Polish communists of Moscow's own choosing (the Lublin Poles, soon to become the Provisional Polish Government). Much of what was subsequently blamed on Yalta, the inclusion of the Lublin Poles in the prominent cabinet positions of the post-war government, was largely decided at Teheran. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 363-383.

Perhaps the single greatest reason for Western acceptance of Soviet demands was the fear that the tremendous efforts and even greater losses of the Red Army would lead the Soviets to accept a separate peace with Germany. In retrospect this fear was poorly founded, but nonetheless it dominated many of the decisions which led to Western concessions. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West, 340.

Although much criticism was subsequently leveled against the political leadership which acquiesced to this dominant Soviet position, circumstances made any other position difficult to execute, and in fact the West was reacting to a foregone reality.

In broad terms, the objectives regarding East Central Europe which the Paris Peace Conference sought to address in 1919 were fairly well known (remarkably so compared to previous diplomatic practice). Such was not the case with regard to the motives which guided Soviet policy in 1945. A number of both competing and complementary explanations suggest themselves for the path of subsequent Soviet activity: first, that East Central Europe provided a springboard for the expansion of a global Communist conspiracy into Western Europe; secondly, that East Central Europe was to serve as a buffer, primarily against a resurgent German military threat; and thirdly, that East Central Europe was to serve as a buffer, but primarily against the political threat to regime survival posed by Western industrial democracy.

Concerning the use of East Central Europe as a highway into the West, evidence revolves around what Stalin thought, as opposed to how Stalin acted. An observer close to Stalin both before and during the war recalled two separate instincts, one national and the other international: "it is engraved on my memory that Stalin ... was not only inspiring Russian nationalism but was himself inspired by it and

identified himself with it."⁹¹ Despite this observation, interpretations of Soviet policy which revolve around the motive of Russian Great Power chauvinism ignore the further observation that despite this national urge, Stalin, while he "did not substantially develop the ideas of Communism, ... championed them and brought them to realization in a society and a state. He (Stalin) did not construct an ideal society ... but he transformed backward Russia into ... an empire that is ever more resolutely and implacably aspiring to world mastery."⁹² The question then was how implacable or resolute was Stalin's commitment to world mastery (at least in the near-term) when compared to subsequent activities in East Central Europe.

Yugoslavia soon provided the test case that determined which Stalin, the nationalist or internationalist, would dictate the course of events in East Central Europe. In May 1945, Tito's Yugoslav forces moved into the Italian province of Venezia Giulia and subsequently invaded Trieste. Efforts by the Allied commander in Italy to dissuade Tito from this course proved ineffective, and the prospect of armed conflict between the Allies and the Yugoslavs over the fate of the Istrian Peninsula loomed large. Churchill advised Truman to

⁹¹Milovan Djilas was a Yugoslav Communist who spent part of the war in Moscow, often in direct contact with Stalin. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, Translated by Michael B. Petrovich, (San Diego: Harvest/HBJ Books, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), 62.

⁹²Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, 190.

halt the movement of troops out of Europe and into the Pacific in preparation for open hostilities. Although Truman hesitated in taking this open measure, Tito voluntarily and reluctantly retreated from Trieste and agreed to an Allied demarcation line.⁹³

Three years later, when Moscow and Belgrade openly split over the issue of the Greek Civil War, both the degree to which Moscow had been irritated by Yugoslav moves at Trieste while consolidation in Poland was taking place, as well as the resulting anger by Yugoslav Communists over the lack of Soviet support for ideological advancement became public knowledge. This Soviet stance indicated a preoccupation with consolidation of Russian gains, rather than an emphasis on revolutionary expansion. This analysis of Soviet motives was further supported by the causes of the Soviet-Yugoslav split itself. Yugoslav support for the Greek Communists (a product of expansionist motives) against the desires of Soviet policy (which feared Western reprisal⁹⁴) prompted Moscow to end support for the Yugoslav regime. The conclusion drawn from the Yugoslav example was that Stalin acted in East Central

⁹³Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 384.

⁹⁴A legitimate fear, subsequently fulfilled by the Truman Doctrine.

Europe from the national motive, and did not plan to use East Central Europe as a highway into the West.⁹⁵

Concerning the use of East Central Europe as a buffer, primarily against a resurgent German military threat, Russian losses in the Great Patriotic War, coupled with the near consummation of German victory, made the need for a geographic buffer real, and the desire for such a buffer reasonable. Especially with regard to the traditional Polish invasion route, the motive of physical security was felt acutely. Although the need for a physical buffer provides a good explanation for Soviet post-war activities in East Central Europe, it by no means provides a complete explanation, particularly with regard to the Soviet conquest of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary already mentioned, as well as with regard to the subsequent political activity within those particular countries. The path of consolidation in East

⁹⁵In a conversation to Tito at the end of the war, Stalin admitted that, "today socialism is possible even under the English monarchy. Revolution is no longer necessary everywhere. Just recently a delegation of British Labourites was here, and we talked about this in particular. Yes, there is much that is new. Yes, socialism is possible even under an English king." Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, 113.

Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 384.

The public face given to this dispute is illuminated by the "Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the Resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties on the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," June 29, 1948, excerpted from The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, (London & New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 71-79 in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, (New York: Random House, 1960), 261-265.

Central Europe suggested other than purely military motives.⁹⁶

Perhaps the best understanding of Soviet security objectives comes from the assertion that like that faced by his Western predecessors twenty-six years earlier, Stalin's threat was essentially political, revolved around the peculiar vulnerabilities of a Russian society too long ruled by absolute dictatorship, and required the use of East Central Europe as a buffer, primarily against the challenge to regime survival posed by Western industrial democracy. This view, predicated on an analysis that the peculiar circumstances of Imperial Russia, the Bolshevik coup, the Civil War, and the subsequent years of Party rule had produced a certain official paranoia, was summarized by George F. Kennan:

Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have

⁹⁶Jan Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 5-6.

The problems of a purely military explanation are explained succinctly by Adam Ulam: "Why in their satellites, did the Soviets ruthlessly and speedily crush all effective opposition, rather than follow the Finnish model? Prudence would seem to have argued that a cautious approach, leaving Poland or Hungary internal autonomy after securing their subordination in matters concerning foreign policy and defense, was preferable to a policy that so grated on Western sensitivities and that made inconceivable that technical and financial aid from America which was so badly needed by the ruined Russian economy."

That the flow of Soviet foreign policy was not a product of potential Western military aggression is further evidenced by the extensive demobilization following the war. In 1960, Khrushchev released the following figures to the Supreme Soviet: Soviet mobilization during the war had climbed from a pre-war level of 4,207,000 men to 11,365,000 men by 1945. By 1948, total troop levels in the Soviet armed forces were 2,874,000 men. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 400, 403-404.

endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world.⁹⁷

Despite the very real belief in Communist orthodoxy (reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson's genuine belief in national self-determination), and genuine geopolitical concerns, Stalin, and through him Soviet policy in East Central Europe, was primarily concerned with regime survival. The greatest threat to regime survival was exposure of Soviet society to the dangerous contagion of Western pluralist industrial democracy. The transmission of the political threat by a sort of frictional osmosis produced for Stalin the need to shelter Russian society from casual contact with a dangerous Western virus.⁹⁸

Certainly Soviet conduct immediately following the war provides ample circumstantial evidence to support this view. Russian agricultural production, barely recovered from the impact of collectivization, had been destroyed in the war. Total industrial production, despite investments made in Siberia, had been reduced by fifty percent. Russian industrial effort, geared towards a massive reconstruction

⁹⁷George F. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," originally printed in Foreign Affairs, XXV, No.4, July 1947. Reprinted in American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 111.

⁹⁸This view has some precedent. The principal calculation that led to Stalin's signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was the conviction on the part of Stalin that "any war, fought on Soviet soil, ... in the end would spell disaster to the regime and to his own personal power." Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 400.

program, required that wartime measures regarding work hours and worker discipline be maintained in spite of the promise of prosperity for the population implied by victory. To ensure that discipline was continued, any exposure to the outside world which might taint renewed efforts was ruthlessly sought out and suppressed.⁹⁹

This internal repression took many forms: whole populations which were exposed to the German occupation were sent to forced labor camps; Americans and the British were portrayed in official propaganda as enemies; a campaign synonymous with Foreign Minister Andrei Zhdanov was conducted to purify Soviet culture; foreign contributions to Russian progress were routinely denounced. Added to these measures was a general worry on the part of the regime concerning the exposure of millions of soldiers to conditions outside of

⁹⁹Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 401-403.

This need for repression was in part a response to how growth was traditionally managed in the Soviet command economy. The post-war reconstruction wished to mimic the methods and success of its predecessor, the first five year plan of 1928-1932. Largely successful as a mobilization scheme, initial industrialization succeeded for several reasons. The collectivization of agriculture provided a large pool of cheap industrial labor. Concentration on heavy industry at the complete neglect of consumer goods production insured that a large portion of wages could be ploughed back into capital investment rather than squandered on consumption. The injection of these high rates of investment into the economy produced a corresponding explosion in capital growth of ten to twelve percent per year. This growth was possible largely because of the freezing of living standards at 1928 levels which was further made possible by the willingness of the state apparatus to brutalize Soviet society.

Post-war reconstruction demanded that not only would this pattern be repeated (which it was successfully), but that living standards were to be reduced to below even 1928 levels, at a time when long-term sacrifice raised the hope of prosperity rather than continued privation. The need to manage this hope by restricting it from knowledge of better alternatives was a central need of the post-war Soviet regime. A. Bergson, "the Gorbachev Revolution," Journal of Economic Issues, October 1987, 31. R. Kellogg, "Modeling Soviet Modernization: an Economy in Transition," Soviet Economy, April 1988, 36.

Soviet borders, and the conduct by that regime of renewed political purges. All of these pieces of evidence "suggest very forcibly that a decisive factor in the shift of Soviet foreign policy following the war was the internal one."¹⁰⁰

Soviet understanding of the essential political nature of the threat produced a social attack on the populations of East Central Europe, the specifics of which are broadly known. The complete closing of East Central European societies by puppet Stalinist regimes, backed by powerful internal political police forces, and ultimately guaranteed by the threat of Soviet military intervention - the overall process of *satellite formation* - served as an effective long-term shield, as a cordon sanitaire in reverse (though of a more sinister nature for the various East Central European societies, given the totalitarian nature of the regimes under which they had to live).

¹⁰⁰These purges started first within the military, as prominent marshals were removed to obscure positions. Zhdanov died in 1948, and all of his supporters were subsequently purged, as were the leaders of the Leningrad Party apparatus. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 400-403.

Two policies which would come much later indicated that subsequent Soviet leadership continued to view the Western threat as a political one aimed at the Russian society. The first involved Soviet toleration of limited economic liberalization in Hungary under Janos Kadar (a liberalization contrary to Marxism, and not copied by Moscow). The second involved Soviet toleration of foreign policy independence by Romania's Ceausescu (an independence which theoretically could have translated into Soviet geopolitical vulnerability). In both cases, Soviet toleration seems to have been bought through assurances of political repression and control. This indicates that the essential character of the Soviet cordon was in fact political. Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: a Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1989), 203-204, 163.

A standard debate revolves around the degree to which Stalin actually planned the eventual Soviet satellite-ization of East Central Europe, with some suggesting Western vacillation as the primary culprit. Perhaps the correct answer lies somewhere in between: Stalin had a definite political goal, but that political goal was tempered by physical security concerns which fluctuated with geography. This led to a flexible strategy which reflected strong ambitions for a quick process of political subjugation in the Northern Tier, and a willingness to temper those ambitions in the Southern Tier, with the overall process always subject to calculations of Western response. In this way Soviet policy was definitely facilitated by Western diplomatic mismanagement.¹⁰¹

Nonetheless, between 1945 and 1948, Communist administrations completely loyal to Moscow seized power in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The process in each of these countries progressed through three identical stages. In the first stage, government was run by a coalition of Communists and returning exiles, with the exiles given positions of great public visibility while the Communist ministers retained the true positions of power.¹⁰² These Communists used the power of their ministries to move

¹⁰¹Jan Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, 5-23.

¹⁰²Such as the Ministry of Defense which controlled the army, or the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the secret police.

their governments into the second stage. In this stage, Communist purges removed popular leaders from positions in the opposition parties, and opposition parties were not allowed to criticize Communist policy. Opposition could be expressed outside the government, but not within the government itself. The third stage was a completion of this process, with opposition parties completely abolished or, at the very best, completely marginalized. By 1948 the process of satellite-ization had been completed in all of East Central Europe excluding Yugoslavia and Albania.¹⁰³

Maintenance of the East Central European buffer required extensive Soviet commitments,¹⁰⁴ and, when those commitments failed, active military intervention (the most prominent of which occurred against the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the Prague Spring in 1968).¹⁰⁵ These commitments and

¹⁰³In Poland, the initial regime in 1945 was already in the second stage. By summer 1945, Romania and Bulgaria were both in the second stage. Hungary reached the third stage in spring 1947, as did the last hold-out, Czechoslovakia, in February 1948. Czechoslovakia was a unique case, because the Soviet Army had withdrawn from it in December 1945, and the process of satellite-ization required a much noticeable coup against the elected government. Because this coup was not executed gradually, in an unnoticed way common to the other countries, the Czech process signalled one of the turning points in Western perceptions of Soviet intentions. Hugh Seton-Watson, The New Imperialism, a Background Book, (Chester Springs, Pennsylvania: Dufour Editions, 1961), 80-82.

Michael Charlton, Eagle and the Small Birds, 53-54.

¹⁰⁴Notably the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 in response to the joining of West Germany to NATO, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which enforced barter trade arrangements between bloc members. David L. Clarke, "Some Revelations About the Warsaw Pact," Report on Eastern Europe, May 3, 1991, 35.

¹⁰⁵Michael Charlton, Eagle and the Small Birds, 135-136.

interventions found a systemic expression in 1968, with the articulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine:

... Nobody interferes in the concrete measures taken to improve the socialist system in the different socialist countries. ... However, the picture changes fundamentally when a danger arises to socialism itself in a particular country. ... the Communists of the fraternal countries could not allow the socialist states to be inactive in the name of an abstractly understood sovereignty, when they saw that the country stood in peril of anti-socialist degradation.¹⁰⁶

What Soviet policy desired was an international recognition of the Brezhnev Doctrine coupled with the specific desire to legitimize and make permanent the Soviet gains at Yalta, particularly with respect to Germany.¹⁰⁷

These desires, coupled with more general strategic designs aimed at the West,¹⁰⁸ prompted Soviet leadership to seek a pan-European security conference the fulfillment of which, beginning in 1954, and acquiring increased urgency by 1969,

¹⁰⁶Harold Russel, "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?" American Journal of International Law, 1976, 253-254. Leonid I. Brezhnev, "The Brezhnev Doctrine," speech by the Soviet Communist Party General Secretary at the fifth congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Warsaw, November 12, 1968, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 20, no. 46, 3-4. Vojtech Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, Analysis and Documentation, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 48.

¹⁰⁷Carol O'Hallaron, "Human Rights as Realpolitik: the United States in the CSCE," in RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook, (London: 1991), 64.

¹⁰⁸Post-Yalta Soviet policy pursued up until August 1991 a broad strategic design. This strategic design intertwined three themes with regard to European security. The first theme involved the efficacy of an all-European system, to include nuclear-weapons-free-zones and the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A second theme of Soviet strategy was that peace would be best served through the mutual cooperation of Western Europe with the socialist community. A third and complementary theme was that American military and nuclear presence in Europe was unwelcome and damaging with respect to Europe's true security interests, as Moscow defined them. Discussion by Dr. Yost, NS 4720, October 10, 1991.

occupied a consistent and prominent position within Soviet foreign policy.¹⁰⁹ The resulting Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which met at Helsinki in 1975 was to have been for the Soviets the systemic fulfillment of a Soviet conquest concluded thirty years previously:

the creation of a military glacis beyond the Soviet Union's western frontier. (Which) offered another cardinal advantage -the insulation of the mass of Soviet citizens at home from the allurements of the capitalist West, with its material seductions and its individual freedoms, while the heirs of Lenin got on with 'the building of Communism'.¹¹⁰

Helsinki in 1975 was the high point of the Soviet use of East Central Europe as a buffer against the West.

Soviet leadership (like the Western leadership that had preceded it), analyzed the danger before it principally as an internal domestic threat, of long-term concern because of the potential translation of ideology into popular challenge to the regime. This threat could best be contained by a grand strategy which shielded Soviet society behind a series of buffer states in East Central Europe - behind a series of political satellites. The process of satellite formation was made possible by political and military support of Stalinist puppet regimes. Because of the unpopular nature of this support, the efforts of Soviet leadership required a sustained, long-term active Soviet political and military

¹⁰⁹Jan Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, 79, 319-320.

¹¹⁰Michael Charlton, The Eagle and the Small Birds, 135.

involvement, which eventually sought international approval and codification through the use of a pan-European security conference.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The formation of both the first and second security phases in East Central Europe was prompted by a similar assessment of security objectives, and grand strategy necessary to meet those objectives. The structures which emerged from each security phase diverged, however, in the application of specific policy instruments to fulfill grand strategy. This divergence resulted from the reaction by East Central European societies towards the extension of hegemony in each particular phase, brought on mainly by differences in the internal characteristics of the hegemon itself. The effects of this popular reaction were to have significant implications for the fate of each respective phase, and are the subject of subsequent analysis.

V. FROM BUFFER TO HIGHWAY

*"The Russians of the tsars as well as the Bolsheviki had been more odious than the Germans, whom we detest."*¹¹¹

The previous chapter analyzed the formation of the first two security phases in East Central Europe, and from that analysis managed to sketch a series of rough parallels between the hegemonic power in each phase, the generic strategy process, and the subsequent role of East Central Europe within a larger European security structure. The purpose of this chapter is to expose further parallels through analysis of the collapse of the first two security phases, specifically with regard to the evolving internal weaknesses of the hegemonic power within each phase, as well as with regard to the role of East Central Europe as a catalyzing agent in that evolving weakness. These two factors explain, particularly with regard to East Central Europe, what one analyst has described as:

the ambiguity of a buffer zone, which may be created as a barrier or containing wall, but is liable to be transformed, by a watershed of power into an extent of low-lying flats, open to inundation by the floods from either side.¹¹²

¹¹¹Comment by General Smigly-Rydz, chief of the Polish Army, during talks with French General Gamelin in Warsaw in July 1936 on the possibility of a Polish-Soviet-French treaty against Germany. William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, an Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), 315.

¹¹²Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 207-208.

A. 1922-1945: THE COLLAPSE OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM

The Versailles system emplaced in East Central Europe in 1919 was to have been guaranteed by the Big Four, operating under the aegis of the League of Nations. The system itself was to operate as a wall against Bolshevik influence from the East, as well as a counterbalance to a recovered Germany in the center of Europe.¹¹³ Support of the small states in East Central Europe which were the embodiment of this strategy required that the Big Four cooperate in regional political initiatives, and contribute willingly assets unique to each power but necessary for common objectives. When the Big Four began to disintegrate as a political alliance, it weakened irreparably the ability of the League to regulate the Versailles system, and the resolve of individual members to sacrifice assets for the maintenance of the system in East Central Europe.

This disintegration transferred the identity of the West from a group of liberal democracies acting in concert under Wilsonian international principles,¹¹⁴ to single countries, or alliances of countries, often fascist dictatorships, which

¹¹³ "France was the chief architect of the dual conception of the new Eastern Europe. It was the last phase of her tradition of making alliances in the rear of the Hapsburg or German enemy." Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 235.

¹¹⁴ This is certainly an oversimplification, but a reasonable one with regard to East Central Europe. Even though the Big Four had significant disagreements on specific policy issues, on a broader level they were able to express a policy coherence which is illustrated by the creation of the Versailles system itself.

acted from principles which were the antithesis of Wilsonian. Consequently, Western hegemony over East Central Europe took a turn which almost guaranteed conflict with Soviet Russia, and in turn ushered Soviet troops, and with them Communism, into East Central Europe. Given this analysis, the cordon sanitaire of East Central European states performed its overt purpose remarkably well. The arrival of the Red Army in Berlin in 1945 proceeded not from an act of Soviet armed aggression, nor did it proceed from the internal revolutionary political upheaval so greatly feared by Western leadership twenty-six years earlier. Communism arrived in East Central Europe as a consequence of internal political and moral failure within the West. .

The United States was the first to depart from support of the Versailles system in East Central Europe, by publicly rejecting the provisions of the Versailles Treaty during Senate ratification. Rejection of the Versailles system, coupled with the victory of the Harding candidacy in the 1920 presidential election, signalled the beginning of an American policy of isolation from European security affairs.¹¹⁵ This

¹¹⁵A number of important caveats need to be made to this common perception of isolationism. From 1920 to 1922, America fundamentally withdrew from European affairs, not only at a political and security level, but with regard to economic aid and financial investment as well. Poland in particular invited American businesses to invest, believing that this would create a stake in Poland for American policy makers. Unfortunately, American businessmen were reluctant to invest in so unstable a region, which many thought would not long survive. Also, Polish fiscal policies (which reflected the financial difficulties taking place across East Central Europe) had resulted in a hyper-inflation which in many ways rivaled Germany's (the Polish mark in 1919 was begged at the 9.8 to the dollar; by 1922, the rate was 17,800 to the dollar. This prompted a Wall Street Journal analysis that

isolation became less complete beginning in 1922, however, as American policy makers began to become increasingly concerned about the growing economic chaos in Europe, especially as to the degree that such chaos affected relations between France and Germany.¹¹⁶ Consequently, the Harding administration embarked upon a policy of economic diplomacy, "a complex network of commercial and financial relationships that linked American well-being to the restoration of European stability ... while rejecting political entanglements and strategic commitments in the Old World."¹¹⁷ Nonetheless, although American isolation was not as complete as is often portrayed, isolationism removed from the Versailles system the one power

Poland's fiscal policy could "only be called the finest bid for bankruptcy ever made by any modern State in Europe with the sole exception of Russia."). Furthermore, immediate post-war American policy discouraged foreign loans for domestic economic reasons.

This situation changed in 1922, when Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes called for a new international conference to restructure the reparations payments schedule of Germany. The result of this conference, the Dawes Plan of 1924, gave a two-hundred million dollar loan to Germany against her war debt. This loan effectively returned American policy to a presence in Europe, acting through the economic policy instrument. Neal Pease Poland, the United States, and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919-1933, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 14-25.

¹¹⁶This concern prompted even such a staunch isolationist as Senator Borah to Comment that "we are drifting, drifting, while the most serious conditions the world has ever experienced are calling for bold and determined action. ... We are verging ... upon another World War, and even if it does not result in war, it will result in such utter economic chaos as would have a more destructive effect upon civilization and upon peoples than war itself." Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest - America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919-1933, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 41-42.

¹¹⁷Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 79.

with the resources essential for successful administration.¹¹⁸

The second of the Big Four to depart from support of the Versailles system,¹¹⁹ also for domestic political reasons, was Italy. The liberal government which had entered Italy in the war on the side of the Allies in 1915 was a picture of apparent stability framed by a host of destabilizing influences.¹²⁰ These destabilizing influences proved irresistible when coupled with the disappointments incurred by the Italian delegation at Paris.¹²¹ The combination of

¹¹⁸Economic diplomacy found its greatest obstacle in French policy, which often included high tariff barriers, was ill-disposed to adjusting reparations payments based on the German ability to pay, and which continued to spend what the Americans considered to be unjustifiably high amounts on defense expenditures. In this way, American policy weakened the Versailles system further, by discouraging a French military posture which would make it effective (especially in the absence of any matching commitments from the other powers).

In another sense, however, economic diplomacy was a godsend to the Versailles system, if only because it was better than no involvement at all. The failure of economic diplomacy is the subject of subsequent discussion, but it opened the door to German penetration in East Central Europe. Melvyn P. Leffler, Elusive Quest, 81.

¹¹⁹Insofar as support implied a unified view of security issues in East Central Europe as defined by France.

¹²⁰In the two decades prior to the war, three distinct challenges had presented themselves to the Italian liberal state. The first was the working class movement, especially virulent in the north. The second was the nationalist movement, which wanted to restore Italy to the status once held by the Roman Empire. The third was the futurist movement, closely linked to the nationalists, which disdained Italy's antiquarian past in favor of a modern industrial state. James Joll, Europe Since 1870, an International History, 3rd Edition, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), 126.

¹²¹Italian nationalism was adamant in completing the process of unification which had reached fruition in 1868. This unification involved recovery of all of the Italia Irredenta populations within the Italian state. These irredentist populations were primarily in Trentino, Trieste, and the Dalmatian coast. Furthermore, Italian policy wished to secure a strategic frontier along the Brenner Pass by annexing the South Tyrol (or Alto Adige as the Italians called it).

Towards these goals the Italians signed the secret Treaty of London on May 23, 1915, with Britain, France, and Russia. The treaty promised Italy

wartime suffering and peacetime disappointment, not only removed from Italian politics a government inclined to support the Versailles system in East Central Europe, but in its place created by 1924 a Fascist state in active opposition to both the Versailles settlements and the French influence in East Central Europe necessary to the functioning of those settlements.¹²²

The British also withdrew to a certain degree from commitments to maintain the Versailles system in East Central Europe, although British disengagement was less a domestic reaction to the lack of concessions gained at Paris (such as in the Italian example), or to constitutional issues of national sovereignty (such as the American example), but rather a more complex combination of divergent policy goals, economic decline, and national malaise. In the first

its claims in the South Tyrol, Trentino, and Dalmatia.

Italian conduct in the war was poor, and with the defeat at Caporetto, Italy was almost knocked out of the fighting. Suffering was on a massive scale, with war dead numbering around seven-hundred thousand. Because of this sacrifice, the Italian delegation at Versailles, led by Prime Minister Orlando, fully expected territorial gains both in the Balkans and in the now defunct Ottoman Empire commiserate with Italian losses.

Woodrow Wilson, who was appalled at the London Treaty, refused to grant Italy any gains other than those already promised, and after bitter negotiating sessions, tried to go over Orlando's head with appeals directly to the Italian people. The Italian delegation stormed out of the Conference, and Orlando's government resigned. This incident marked the beginning of a growing period of instability in Italian politics, which when coupled with those forces already critical of the liberal state, paved the way for Mussolini. James Joll, Europe Since 1870, 204, 264

¹²²Mussolini actually came to power on the night of October 29, 1922, when he was asked to form a government in lieu of a 'March on Rome' and coup d'etat. Mussolini was unable to construct the Fascist state until 1924, when a new electoral law helped the Fascist party to gain a large majority in the Italian Parliament. This process was completed by November 1926, when opposition deputies were formally divested of their seats. From this point on, Mussolini was able to use what he called 'our fierce totalitarian will' in 'making the nation Fascist'. James Joll, Europe Since 1870, 268.

instance, British opinion quickly came to consider that the terms of the Versailles peace had been unduly harsh, and that future prospects of stability hinged more on rehabilitating Germany than on punishing her. Towards this end the obstacle was France, and British policy increasingly found itself in opposition to its French counterpart on a number of other issues as well.¹²³

Coupled with this policy divergence was a desire on the part of the British Foreign Office to concentrate declining resources on imperial obligations, specifically in India,¹²⁴ and in general to conduct colonial policy from a position of legitimacy rather than coercion. This meant that support for the Versailles system in East Central Europe was not a prominent part of British policy in general, and that the colonial focus which was the centerpiece of British policy

¹²³In determining the details of the Versailles system, Britain and France had little agreement. In the war between Greece and Turkey, France supported Turkey, while Britain supported Greece. France supported Polish claims in Silesia against Germany, whereas Britain did not. France supported Polish acquisition of territory east of the Curzon Line, whereas Britain did not. These disagreements prompted Lord Curzon to comment in 1921 that, "... the Foreign Office is only too painfully aware that in almost every quarter of the globe, whether it be Silesia or Bavaria or Hungary or the Balkans - Morocco or Egypt or Turkey or Mesopotamia - the representatives of France are actively pursuing a policy which is either unfriendly to British interests or, if not that, is consecrated to the promotion of a French interest which is inconsistent with ours." Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace, International Relations in Europe 1918-1933, Christopher Thorne, ed. The Making of the 20th Century, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 34.

¹²⁴One of the critical interests groups in favor of this approach was the British Army, which considered the Continental War just fought to an aberration, and its real mission to be in the policing of the colonies. The Irish problem further focussed efforts on colonial issues, as did inter-service rivalry. The Royal Navy was able to secure the bulk of the defense budget, which in turn left room for only a small army. The combination of small army and large navy contributed to a strategy of policing the colonies. Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1986), 11-16.

would itself be given a decreasing share of the yearly budget.¹²⁵ This British reluctance to either agree with French assessments in Europe, or to back up those assessments when there was agreement, produced a situation which, when coupled with the loss of American and Italian support, demanded that the Versailles system, if it was to be maintained, would of necessity be maintained by French hegemony in East Central Europe.¹²⁶

Throughout the first security phase, the West maintained its position as the hegemonic power in East Central Europe, and used this position of preponderant influence to support the small states in the region as a bulwark against Bolshevik Russia. By 1922, however, the West was fractured and divided into competing interest groups, and the spokesman for the West with regard to the cordon sanitaire was a France backed by military power. This Western support for the cordon had its high-water mark in 1927 with the signing of the Franco-

¹²⁵In 1919, British military expenditures were 604,000,000 pounds; in 1920 that number was reduced to 292,000,000 pounds, and then to 111,000,000 pounds in 1921 and 1922. Expenditures were increased to 118,000,000 in 1923, and remained at that level (fourteen percent of the total budget) until the 1930's.

These reductions were supported by the Ten Year Rule, in which "the Cabinet forecast that 'the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war in the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose'. ... The military commitments of Empire, then, were those perceived at the time to be the irreducible minimum necessary for its preservation. ... Full diplomatic support for the League of Nations was pledged but as it became clear that any enforcement procedure called for by the League would be heavily dependent on British forces, British governments became increasingly cautious about any arrangements that might actually require British troops or ships." Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 17-18.

¹²⁶William L. Shirer, Collapse of the Third Republic, 137-152.

Yugoslav treaty of friendship and cooperation. Thereafter, Western political weakness would erode this position of French hegemony, and make possible in East Central Europe the eventual presence of state Communism, against which the cordon had originally been designed.

Western political weakness revolved around the issue of Germany, and manifested itself in two distinct ways: as a political failure to orchestrate international circumstances and economic conditions in such a way as to fully integrate Weimar Germany into the Western democratic industrial community, and as moral failure to confront decisively the problem of Adolf Hitler, once circumstances had served to insure the death of the Weimar Republic. It is towards this second weakness that this analysis now turns, in large part because of the role of East Central Europe in German expansion. The failure to contain German expansion in East Central Europe is really the story of the weakening of French hegemony in that region, first in the Southern Tier by Fascist Italy, and then in both the Northern and Southern Tiers by Nazi Germany.

Within East Central Europe were roughly three security groupings: the 1921 Polish-Romanian defensive alliance against Russia, the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania against the revisionist claims of Hungary, also signed in 1921, and the Balkan Entente of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania against the revisionist claims of Bulgaria, which was

finally signed in 1934. All of these agreements were assured by French assistance treaties supported by French hegemony. If Polish diplomatic realities had historically been held captive to the geopolitical ebb and flow of Germany and Russia, so also had been the influence on the Danubian and Balkan states to that of Russia and Austria-Hungary. With the temporary decline of Russian influence in 1918, and the simultaneous collapse of Hapsburg power, Fascist Italy looked to the Southern Tier as a source of influence and prestige.¹²⁷

Subsequently, Italian policy involved itself in four objectives:

the extension of virtual protectorate over Austria in the north and Albania in the east; the isolation and disruption of Yugoslavia, which was not only contiguous but also the strongest of the Balkan powers, by fermenting the Croat question in the north and the Macedonian question in the south; the support of the revisionist Powers, Bulgaria and Hungary; and consequently opposition to Yugoslavia's ally France as dominant Power in Eastern Europe.¹²⁸

The success of Italy in pursuit of these goals would weaken the French position in East Central Europe so as to prepare the way for Germany.

In pursuit of these four broad themes, Italy conducted policy by means of overt diplomacy, secret initiatives, and illegal measures designed to circumvent the treaty

¹²⁷Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 248-249.

¹²⁸Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 252. (emphasis added)

restrictions of the Versailles system.¹²⁹ In 1926, Mussolini was able to politically cement his Fascist vision by divesting opposition delegates of their seats in the Italian Parliament. Soon after, he revealed the character of the coming Italian-French rivalry in East Central Europe by rejecting a French proposal for a tripartite treaty of friendship and security between France, Italy, and Yugoslavia, which had as its object the stability of the Balkans. In place of the French initiative, Italy concluded a treaty of friendship and security with Albania in 1926,¹³⁰ with Hungary in 1927,¹³¹ and with Turkey and Greece in 1928.¹³²

There was a momentary attempt on the part of the Balkan states to halt the divisions created by Italian-French Rivalry, and between 1930 and 1933, Turkey, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia formed an unofficial Balkan

¹²⁹Secret measures involved Italian (and subsequently Hungarian) support for terrorists organizations which would destabilized French allies. The two most prominent terrorist groups were the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which was based in Bulgaria (like Hungary, one of the revisionist powers who opposed French support for the Versailles border settlements, and which use IMRO as a tool of revision against Yugoslavia), and the Croat Ustasa based in Yugoslavia. In 1929, the Ustasa and IMRO united in a political alliance, and the head of the two organizations, a man named Pavelic, planned subsequent operations from either Italy or Hungary.

A critical element of the Versailles settlements had involved armaments restrictions against the former Central Powers: Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In 1928, Italy was discovered to be running guns to Hungary (the Szent Gotthard Incident), and in 1933 to Austria (the Hirtenberg Incident). Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 253.

¹³⁰A treaty very much on Italian terms, which in effect amounted to a loss of Albanian sovereignty over foreign affairs.

¹³¹A treaty which led to Yugoslav membership in the Little Entente.

¹³²In 1927, Italy strengthened her hold on Albania by signing a treaty of mutual defense. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 253.

Conference which met yearly. The inability of Bulgaria to relinquish revisionist claims destroyed any chance at a trans-Balkan treaty, and the subsequent formation of the Balkan Entente in 1934 excluded Bulgaria from membership. This gave to the Balkan Entente the same anti-revisionist flavor as that of the Little Entente (directed against the revisionist claims of Hungary), and left in place in the Southern Tier an excluded small power whose grievance could be exploited by any Great Power wishing to challenge the status quo.¹³³

1933 was the apogee of French hegemony in East Central Europe, as well as the high-water mark of Italian opposition to that position. In February, fourteen days after Hitler assumed power in Germany, the Little Entente signed a Pact of Organization which codified in perpetuity all bilateral treaty obligations (which is to say treaties of friendship and security with France), and which set up a Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers to coordinate foreign policy and defense issues. In March of that year, Mussolini proposed the Four Power Pact, which would replace the French position in bilateral treaty obligations with a grouping of Great Powers (Italy, France, Britain, and Germany) in which France would be a minority member.¹³⁴ The Four Power Act as it was proposed

¹³³Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 254.

¹³⁴The Four Power Act was to pursue a two-part program: to promote the revision of the peace treaties, and to recognize over time a position of equality in armaments to all of the revisionist powers - Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, and Germany. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 256.

would have been the logical conclusion of Italy's program of gathering prestige, revision of the Versailles system, and rivalry with the preponderant French position. Although France was able to gut the key Italian provisions of the Act that finally was signed in June 1933 (forcing Italy to settle for consolidating her influence on the revisionist states in East Central Europe), the French position was weakened, and the precedent for a concert of Powers which would dictate policy five years later during the Czech Crisis was established.¹³⁵

The second element which contributed to the inability of the West to solve the German problem was the growing impact of the economic World Crisis, ushered in by the collapse of the American stock market in 1929, which was to have serious repercussions in the French ability to maintain the cordon sanitaire in East Central Europe. Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania were agricultural societies between the wars, with Poland, Hungary, and Romania dependent

¹³⁵The final act in the French-Italian rivalry occurred in October 1934. Italy had expended a great deal of effort in establishing influence over Austrian domestic affairs, even going so far as to mobilize four divisions on the Austrian border and to threaten invasion during the Nazi putsch of that year. Yugoslavia, which feared Italian encirclement (through positions in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania), announce that she too would invade Austria if the Italians crossed the border. France wished to broker an agreement between the two parties, and towards this end the Yugoslav King Alexander sailed to Marseilles to deliver a message to the French Foreign Secretary Barthou in October. In Marseilles, King Alexander was assassinated by a Bulgarian member of IMRO who had trained in Hungary, and who operated according to a plot organized by Pavelic in Italy. Italy refused to extradite Pavelic to Yugoslavia. France, which feared growing Balkan instability, by secret agreement pressured the Yugoslav government not to publicly condemn Italy. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 257.

on net exports of grain for economic survival. Unfortunately for these countries, the liberal democracies in the West were unable for different reasons to erect consistent policies to relieve this East Central European agricultural surplus.¹³⁶

This inability to export a fundamental economic commodity was softened by the American policy of economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy in turn depended on an atmosphere of ever increasing prosperity and the subsequent continued creation of a large market for foreign goods. As long as prosperity continued, American foreign policy could be dissuaded from a collision course with competing domestic priorities. The collapse of the stock market in 1929, and the fall into economic depression completed by 1932 fundamentally changed this political calculus so that domestic political considerations would increasingly override the underlying elements of the economic diplomacy of the 1920's. This process was only accelerated by the belief that the security crises of a decade earlier had receded, so that by the 1930's "American officials felt less pressure to take risks in behalf of European stability."¹³⁷

¹³⁶The Americans were themselves net agricultural exporters; the French were agriculturally self-sufficient, and, because of a strong domestic agricultural lobby, felt constrained to do nothing; Britain, in accordance with her colonial policy, had cemented at the Ottawa Conference in 1924 a system of favorable intra-imperial agricultural tariffs which provided for all of her needed food imports. Martin Wright, "Eastern Europe," 225.

¹³⁷Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 193.

The World Crisis revealed French support for the cordon for what it was: a series of diplomatic initiatives not backed by any fundamental economic relationship between the principals involved. As the 1930's were to continue, the small states of East Central Europe would uncover greater and greater difficulty in adhering to commitments which did not alleviate domestic hardships, especially when alternative commitments were made available. Throughout the 1930's, Nazi Germany proved willing to supply such an alternative economic commitment.

The centerpiece of Weimar foreign policy had for twelve years been an entente with Soviet Russia.¹³⁸ The creation of the Nazi state in 1933, however, signalled an end to this policy, and in so doing began a process of diplomatic upheaval which quickly dismantled the elements of the French-controlled Versailles system, and subsequently substituted Germany as

¹³⁸This entente was codified by the Treaty of Rapallo. In 1922, Lloyd George chaired a summit conference in Genoa to discuss economic reconstruction. At this conference German Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau and Soviet Foreign Minister Georgii Chicherin met alone and concluded a series of agreements on financial debts, expanding economic ties, military cooperation, and German technical aid. These agreements ended the isolation of the two greatest revisionist powers excluded from the Versailles system. Rapallo paved the way for German military treaty violations (conducted in secret on Soviet soil), and gave the Soviets a diplomatic bargaining position in Europe which hitherto they had not possessed. As such, Rapallo was the first manifestation of the Western political inability to solve the German question: the failure to orchestrate international circumstances and economic conditions in such a way as to fully integrate Weimar Germany into the Western democratic industrial community. Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy, 61.

George Kennan described the Soviet success at Rapallo in the following way: "one part Soviet resourcefulness and singlemindedness of purpose; two parts amateurism, complacency, and disunity on the part of the West. It is not the last time, in examining the history of Soviet foreign policy, that we shall see this recipe play a part, as the Soviet government advances from the initial weakness of 1921 to the pinnacle of power and success it occupies in the wake of World War II." George F. Kennan, Russia and the West, 212.

Western spokesman in East Central Europe. In replacing French hegemony with Nazi German, German diplomatic initiatives placed the security fate of East Central Europe in the hands of a Western hegemon intent on eventual military confrontation with Soviet Russia.

This touchstone of this diplomatic upheaval in East Central Europe was a Poland of two minds about the phenomena of Naziism. In 1919, Poland had pursued an immediate post-war policy of border settlements which at once placed it in opposition to Germany and Soviet Russia. For this reason Poland had looked askance at the Rapallo accords uniting these two hostile revisionist powers. This Polish nervousness had made easier the task of acquiescence to French demands, made under the aegis of a French security guarantee, for rapprochement with Poland's immediate East Central European neighbors, in particular Czechoslovakia.¹³⁹

Such a rapprochement was not to Poland's liking, and she accepted it with barely concealed reluctance. Another characteristic of the Polish regime was a greater hatred of Russia - Imperial or Soviet, than of Germany - Imperial, Republican, or Fascist.¹⁴⁰ When France refused to back

¹³⁹Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 258.

¹⁴⁰This greater antipathy towards Russia over Germany owed its source to the personal power of Pilsudski, who from 1926 onward had cemented his position at the expense of the right wing of Dmowski. Previous discussion has already covered the sources of Pilsudski's personal animosity towards Russian power. Also, the fact that Pilsudski had come to power by virtue of a violent coup in May 1926, and that he subsequently ruled in an authoritarian manner, reduced for him the negative attractions of Naziism

Polish overtures regarding military actions against Germany in March and November 1933, Poland felt compelled to sign a ten year pact of non-aggression with the Nazi regime in January 1934. This Polish-German pact was the first fracture in the French operation of the Versailles system, and brought Russian Communism one step closer to East Central Europe.¹⁴¹

Polish-German alliance freed Poland from her previous position of restraint with regard to hostility towards her neighbors, and paved the way for irredentist claims to be made at the expense of Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, opposition to Fascism moved Soviet Russia from the position of revisionist power, to that of a status quo power, and in so moving led to admission in the League of Nations in September 1934.¹⁴² This legitimizing of the Soviet state made Russia eligible as a treaty partner in agreements of security guarantee. Consequently, Soviet Russia replaced Poland as the French counterweight to an expansionist Germany. This Soviet position was confirmed by formal Soviet pacts of mutual

which appalled liberal democrats in the West. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 55-69.

¹⁴¹Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 258.

¹⁴²Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet Policy, 75-77. Also George F. Kennan, Russia and the West, 276-286.

assistance with France on May 2, 1935, and Czechoslovakia on May 16, 1935.¹⁴³

The alliance between Poland and Germany, the subsequent substitution of Russia for Poland as a French counter against German expansion, and the codifying of this substitution through pacts of mutual assistance effectively ended the role of East Central Europe as a cordon sanitaire against Communist expansion further into Europe. "With this rearrangement of forces the political subsidence of Eastern Europe was accomplished. Instead of a barrier it became a valley, imperfectly traversed by the ridge of Czechoslovakia."¹⁴⁴ This ending was cemented by the subsequent German remilitarization of the Rhineland, French indifference towards halting that action,¹⁴⁵ and consequent loss of a credible

¹⁴³In the fall of 1936, Belgium withdrew from its military alliance with France. French Premier Leon Blum was led to remark later that, "I sensed with cruel anguish (that Belgium withdrawal) was a new sign, a new symptom of the progressive dismantling of all our European positions."

The Franco-Soviet Pact had been long advocated by French military leadership, but domestic conservative elements had delayed its signing until the end of an acrimonious domestic political debate. William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, 313.

¹⁴⁴Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 260.

¹⁴⁵In 1925, Germany had voluntarily agreed to the demilitarization of the Rhineland imposed by the Versailles treaty of 1919. Germany had agreed to this provision provided that Germany's western frontier was insured by multinational guarantee, and that Germany's eastern border would be open to future revision. The Franco-Russian Pact was called by Hitler an act of bad faith in pursuit of the promised revision of the eastern borders (the alliance was seen as a guarantee of the status quo). Hitler used this pretext, this violation of the spirit of Locarno, as justification for remilitarization.

A demilitarized Rhineland had been a key component of French guarantees in all of her bilateral treaties in East Central Europe because, in the event of German expansion, France could quickly strike into the industrial center of Germany. Hitler's move in 1936 effectively eliminated the French guarantees, by removing the capability of swift punishment for German expansion. William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, 251-259.

French guarantee for the security of the small states of East Central Europe.

. Lack of French credibility, coupled with German economic expansion (made more important by the World Crisis, and the inability of the Western Powers to absorb East Central European agricultural surpluses), initiated a process in which the small states of East Central Europe progressively sought to reconcile themselves with the desires of a resurgent Germany. This process in effect ended French hegemony in East Central Europe and replaced it with German hegemony; Germany became the spokesman for the West. Although Poland reversed her course with the remilitarization of the Rhineland and renewed her security ties with France, and although Czechoslovakia continued to depend on French support, the remilitarization of the Rhineland insured that "even if France still had the will to help ... she could not do so except by a full-scale war against Germany."¹⁴⁶

The arrival of Soviet Russia in East Central Europe in 1945 resulted not from a failure of the cordon sanitaire, but rather as a consequence of internal political and moral failure within the West. Western political weakness revolved around the issue of Germany, and manifested itself in two distinct ways: as a failure to integrate Weimar Germany into the larger community of the West, and as an inability to

¹⁴⁶Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 263.

confront the problem of Adolf Hitler as successor to the Weimar Republic. The process within which the West failed to resolutely confront Nazi expansion began with the fracturing of the Versailles alliance, and the subsequent placing of responsibility for maintenance of the Versailles system in East Central Europe exclusively in the hands of French policy.

This process was continued through the weakening of the French position by Italian diplomatic initiatives in the 1920's, and by the growing economic World Crisis in the 1930's. Consequently, the diplomatic upheaval proceeding from the Polish-German rapprochement in 1933 allowed the rehabilitation of Soviet Russia as a status quo power in alliance with the West against Nazi Germany. Russian rehabilitation was used as a justification for German remilitarization of the Rhineland. German remilitarization produced French security guarantees in East Central Europe which could only be fulfilled by full-scale war with Germany. This scenario was subsequently fulfilled by the Czech crisis of 1938, and the German invasion of Poland in 1939.

With the coming of the Second World War and with the subsequent defeat of Nazi Germany, the final, physical collapse of the Versailles system of cordon sanitaire was completed. The final verdict of this Western internal political failure was perhaps best summarized by George Kennan:

Individually, ... (Germany) could be defeated only if the democracies had the collaboration of ... (the Soviet Union). But such collaboration, if permitted to proceed to the point of complete victory, would mean the relative strengthening of the collaborating power and its eventual appearance as a greedy and implacable claimant at the peace table. Not only that: any war in which (the Soviet Union) was fighting on the side of the democracies could scarcely be fought to a complete and successful finish without placing the collaborating totalitarian power in occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe simply by virtue of the sweep of military operations. ... we begin to wonder whether the great mistakes of Western statesmen in connection with this world war were really those of the wartime period at all - whether they were not rather the earlier mistakes, or perhaps we ought to say earlier 'circumstances' - which had permitted the development of a situation so grievously and fatefully 'loaded' against Western interests.¹⁴⁷

B. 1989: MORAL COLLAPSE AND THE END OF PHASE TWO

The Soviet system of East Central European satellite states performed its role as a political/ideological buffer with callous efficiency until 1989, when, inexplicably, a series of popular uprisings toppled the aging Marxist regimes in the region. This collapse of the second security phase was not caused, however, by a failure of the satellite policy (despite the apparent progression of discontent from East Central Europe into Soviet Russia), but rather because of an internal, Soviet Russian political failure. The Soviet political failure revolved around the issue of economic performance (much in the same way that the previous Western political failure had revolved around the issue of Germany),

¹⁴⁷George F. Kennan, "World War II," first published in The Review of Politics, XII, April 1950, American Diplomacy, 75,77. (emphasis added)

and also manifested itself in two ways: as the avenue through which increased Western human rights contact with East Central Europe (and from East Central Europe to Soviet Russia) could be funneled, and as the altar upon which the power of the Russian Communist Party could be sacrificed.

This essential political weakness¹⁴⁸ allowed the West to use economic leverage as an entry into greater human rights contacts with East Central Europe, contacts hostile to the original political intent of the satellite system. At the same time, Soviet internal attempts to solve the economic problem led to a system of glasnost directed at the Russian Communist Party, the result of which was the gradual but total dismemberment of Party power. The destruction of Party prestige removed from the Soviet leadership the critical constituency (followed closely by the army) upon which regime survival ultimately depended. The uprisings in East Central Europe in 1989 which resulted were a product of the turbulence created by this political inability to solve the Soviet economic problem.

The Soviet society shielded from contact with the West at the end of the Second World War found itself embarked upon a reconstruction program modeled on that of the first Five Year Plan of 1928-1932. This traditional Soviet economic

¹⁴⁸Russian economic problems should be seen as essentially a political failure, flowing as they did, not from cyclical forces, but from the rigidity of the Soviet economic philosophy.

mobilization scheme relied for the most part on large infusions of labor and capital investment to promote overall growth of gross national product. Industrial labor necessary for the conduct of the initial Five Year Plan was provided for out of the personnel surpluses produced by the forced collectivization of agriculture.¹⁴⁹ In the post World War II reconstruction, industrial labor was obtained by continued efforts at collectivization, by demobilization of troops, by conforming the efforts of the existing workforce to wartime work schedules and labor discipline, and by retaining the efforts of populations displaced from their homelands by Stalinist relocation policies.¹⁵⁰

The second ingredient of the economic mobilization scheme was the requirement of large infusions of capital investment. Capital investment was accomplished through the concentration on heavy industry at the complete neglect of consumer goods production. This concentration insured that a large portion of industrial wages could be plowed back into capital investment (through savings forced by scarcity) rather than squandered on consumption. In the initial Five Year Plan, this savings versus consumption ratio translated into living

¹⁴⁹Collectivization had on Soviet industrialization an effect similar to that of the Corn Laws and Enclosure Acts on British industry one-hundred years earlier. By industrializing agriculture (placing large tracts under the management of small numbers of people), millions were ejected from the small village environment and made their way to the cities. This process provided a large pool of cheap, willing industrial workers.

¹⁵⁰For example, the Volga Germans or the Crimean Tatars or the Meskhetian Turks. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 402-403.

standards frozen at 1928 levels. In the post-war reconstruction, the same approach was employed, but with the important caveat that living standards were held at pre-1928 levels. In both instances, conformity to the state-mandated growth policy was insured by the willingness of the state party and security apparatus to brutalize Soviet society.¹⁵¹

The injection of a large labor force and high rates of capital investment into the Soviet economic reconstruction produced an explosion in gross national product (ten to twelve percent growth per year) in the immediate post-war years which corresponded favorably to that produced by the first Five Year Plan. In the post-Stalin era, however, Soviet leadership felt compelled to address a critical shortcoming of the traditional economic mobilization scheme: the disjunction between industrial production and the new technical revolution guiding industrial innovation in the West.¹⁵² From the mid 1950's onward, Soviet economic policy would be increasingly handicapped by the inability to plumb the relationship between

¹⁵¹A. Bergson, "The Gorbachev Revolution," 31. R. Kellogg, "Modeling Soviet Modernization: an Economy in Transition," 36.

¹⁵²Beginning with Khrushchev on, the state apparatus placed increasing importance on scientific achievement. Unfortunately, this emphasis was centrally controlled, and although it resulted in such achievements as the Soviet space program, it could not translate into a general increase in consumer goods production, or quality goods and services in general. Those who were a product of the new technical education system were often contemptuous towards labor, preferring to work within the confines of academia. Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power, 557.

scientific breakthrough, industrial productivity, and overall levels of growth.¹⁵³

The relationship between overall levels of growth and technological advancement is fairly clear: overall growth is a product of change in labor (dL) added to change in capital (dK) added to a change in the combination of technology, efficiency, and resulting productivity (dT). The relative weights of each of these factors in the growth equation is three to one to one in favor of dT, dL, and dK respectively. In other words, twenty percent of overall growth in gross national product is a result in growth in labor, twenty percent is a result of growth in capital, and sixty percent is a result of productivity factors having to do with technology and efficiency breakthroughs. Technology and efficiency breakthroughs in turn revolve around investments in human capital.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³"In one of his speeches, the prominent scientist Academician Petr Kapitsa compared Soviet industry to an ichthyosaur, a prehistoric beast with a long enormous body and a tiny head; that is a huge industrial apparatus in which science played an extremely insignificant role." Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power, 556-557.

¹⁵⁴Often in developing countries, "output has increased at a higher rate than can be explained by an increase in only the inputs of labor and physical capital. ... Although some of this progress may be incorporated in physical capital, the improvement in intangible human qualities are more significant. ... The characteristic of 'economic backwardness' is still manifest in several particular forms: low labor efficiency, factor immobility, limited specialization in occupations and in trade, a deficient supply of entrepreneurship, and customary values and traditional social institutions that minimize the incentives for economic change." Gerald M. Meier, "Investment in Human Capital - note," Leading Issues in Economic Development, fifth edition, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1989), 450.

Despite efforts at limited reform,¹⁵⁵ the inability of Soviet leadership throughout the 1960's and 1970's to grapple effectively with the human factors of productivity produced a two-part pattern of economic decline: overall growth rates fell significantly, as did the ability to produce specific high-technology products in competition with the West. Throughout both decades, the classic Soviet formula for high growth rates (infusions into the industrial labor pool of large numbers of formerly agricultural workers; capital investments bought through the scarcity of consumer goods; both made possible by the heavy hand of the state apparatus) proved unable to maintain its high initial performance. Soviet leadership, in turn proved unable to foster the sort of social and economic environment within which an investment in human capital would pay dividends. By 1970, overall growth had declined from ten to twelve percent at the end of post-war reconstruction, to four to eight percent by 1970, to two-tenths to two percent by 1985.¹⁵⁶

Towards this systemic inability, this internal political failure, to creatively and successfully confront the problem

¹⁵⁵In particular, the Khrushchev reforms in education and public finance were an attempt to tackle the problem of human productivity. These reforms were often very limited and poorly done. Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power, 556-559.

¹⁵⁶The 1970 figure still seemed to be pretty high. Compared to former levels however, growth in the Soviet Union had declined by fifty percent in just ten years. It was this trend, this downward movement, which must have alarmed Soviet leadership. Marshall Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economist," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990, 29. "Massed Against the Past," The Economist, October 20, 1990.

of human capital development Soviet policy adopted two approaches relevant to the collapse of the second security phase in East Central Europe: a policy of obtaining from the West whatever high-technologies which were unattainable in the Soviet economy, as well as general concessions on trade; and, a policy of economic restructuring to attack the root causes of the human capital deficiencies. The first approach, codified in the Basket 2 accords of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, created the first rent in the political glacis of the iron curtain. The second approach, formalized under Gorbachev's program of perestroika in 1986, insured that that initial rent, once enlarged, could not easily be mended.

Initially, the issue of human rights accords stood little chance of being placed on the agenda of a pan-European security conference. The Soviets, who wanted a conference to codify territorial gains made at Yalta and political gains articulated in the Brezhnev Doctrine, were very much disinclined to allow a human rights curriculum to be placed before the proposed negotiations. The Americans, in particular Henry Kissinger, were reluctant to proceed with a conference at all, and even more reluctant to include human rights issues in the agenda should such a conference take place.¹⁵⁷ Nonetheless, Soviet urgency for a conference

¹⁵⁷To reiterate: post-Yalta Soviet policy pursued up until August 1991 a broad strategic design. This strategic design intertwined three themes with regard to European security. The first theme involved the efficacy of an all-European system, to include nuclear-weapons-free-zones and the

suggested the possibility of Soviet human rights concessions which might be bought by the West at the price of increased economic cooperation. It was with full cognizance then, of Soviet strategic objectives and European desires, that American negotiators in 1972 participated in preliminary meetings for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to convene in 1973 at Helsinki.

Initial popular reaction in the West, and particularly in the United States, towards the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 was skeptical at best, and explosively

simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A second theme of Soviet strategy was that peace would be best served through the mutual cooperation of Western Europe with the socialist community. A third and complementary theme was that American military and nuclear presence in Europe was unwelcome and damaging with respect to Europe's true security interests, as Moscow defined them. David S. Yost, "Soviet Aims in Europe," Society, Vol. 24, No. 5, July/August 1987, 72-79.

Added to these long-term objectives in relation to the West, was a more specific desire to legitimize and make permanent the Soviet gains at Yalta, particularly with respect to a divided Germany. Furthermore, the Soviets wanted international recognition of the Brezhnev Doctrine articulated after the Czech invasion of 1968. Beginning in 1954, and acquiring increased urgency by 1969, the search for a pan-European conference on security issues occupied a consistent and prominent position within Soviet foreign policy. Carroll O'Hallaron, "Human Rights as Realpolitik: the United States in the CSCE," 64. Jan Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, 79, 319-320.

American policy makers were initially cold to Soviet requests for a pan-European conference, seeing it correctly as an important element in a broader Soviet strategy - a strategy dedicated to severing American security ties with Europe. Five things served to change American thinking in the years between 1968 and 1972: 1) detente had become a centerpiece of Kissinger's foreign policy, and a pan-European conference was seen as serving detente; 2) at an internal level and in a limited way, Soviet interests in East Central Europe were increasingly perceived as legitimate by American policy makers; 3) the increasing Soviet urgency for a conference could be parlayed into an agreement on a series of confidence-building measures (CBM's); 4) the issue of human rights could be used to de-legitimize Soviet claims in Eastern Europe, or at the very least to change the basis of Soviet legitimacy from a strictly power correlation, to what one analyst described as a more 'organic' relationship; 5) the West Europeans showed great enthusiasm for an all-European security conference, particularly with regard to human rights and free travel of ideas. Carroll O'Hallaron, "Human Rights as Realpolitik: the United States in the CSCE," 68. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," remarks by the counselor to the Department of State at a meeting of U.S. ambassadors in Europe, London, December 1975, official State Department summary, The New York Times, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 97.

negative at worst. The Soviets claimed, and were in large part believed, to have accomplished all of their objectives with regard to codifying the post-Yalta political borders in East Central Europe; also, the Soviets appeared to have gained sweeping economic concessions from the West at little cost to themselves; finally, the Soviets achieved these concessions at the cost of agreeing to human rights accords which were imprecisely defined, difficult to verify, and impossible to enforce. Towards each of these objectives, Soviet claims and Western popular fears of success were overstated: the limited Soviet victory which proceeded from the Final Act in fact was, in the long run, counter productive for the continued buffer role of East Central Europe.¹⁵⁸

The Helsinki Final Act produced accords in three broad areas called Baskets. Basket 1 involved general principles and security related issues. Basket 2 dealt with economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. Basket 3 revolved around human rights, to include such areas as: "expansion of human contacts across borders, improvement of access to printed and broadcast information, improvement in the working conditions of journalists, and expansion of cultural and

¹⁵⁸Basket 1 - Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings Eleven Years after Helsinki, Report to the Congress of the United States by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vol. 2, November 1986, 4-5.

educational cooperation."¹⁵⁹ Of the three Baskets, Basket 1 issues proved to be the most controversial for Western politicians, provided the most ammunition for media and popular opposition, and contributed almost all of the moral, if not legal or organizational, framework for more recent understandings about pan-European security. Specifically, within Basket 1, the statements on general principles provided most of the backbone for the public debate.¹⁶⁰

By 1978, however, Basket 2 principles on economic cooperation had come to dominate the agenda of the Communist regimes in East Central Europe, had in fact become regarded as "a basis and at the same time a barometer for detente."¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹Basket 1 - Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 4.

¹⁶⁰The most controversial of the general principles were the provisions on: inviolability of frontiers, sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states. In all of these principles the Soviets claimed, and the Western press largely believed, that their long-term strategic desires were fulfilled, with no compensation to the West, and with no geopolitical costs for the Soviets. In fact, both Soviet claims and Western press reaction were incomplete and misleading. Intensive negotiations caused the Soviets to make major concessions in the language of the principles. For example, the principle of inviolability of frontiers restricted states from changes made by assaulting frontiers, thus leaving open issues such as the peaceful unification of Germany, or the national claims of ethnic minorities. The principle of territorial integrity was interpreted by the Soviets to restrict outside interference in ethnic/national agitations; in fact, the West interpreted this clause retroactively, and used it to condemn past Soviet territorial acquisition (such as in the Baltics). On the whole then the Basket 1 section on general principles when it did not directly favor Western objectives, only indirectly favored the Soviet position. Harold Russel, "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?" American Journal of International Law, 1976, 253-254, 249-257, 263, 265. Jan Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, 326-327.

¹⁶¹There were three reasons for this: 1) Soviet Russia was urging the convening of three pan-European 'Brezhnev Conferences' on energy, transportation and environment. The conference on energy was intended to create tension within the Western alliance; the conference on transportation was meant to use Western capital to expand economic infrastructure; the conference on the environment was to pander to the good will of certain groups in the West while securing available Western technical knowledge. 2)

This had two direct consequences for the breaking of the political barrier of East Central Europe. The first involved the intangible benefits of intertwining the Soviet command economy with the market economies of the West through informal contacts with Western businessmen.¹⁶² The second implication of this increased desire for Western Basket 2 cooperation was the opportunity that it afforded Western policy to use economic concessions as a bargaining chip for greater Basket 3 openings in East Central Europe.¹⁶³ These openings allowed in the 1970's and early 1980's the practice of increased high-level political consultations between individual countries in the West and their counterparts in East-Central Europe such as

The CMEA members had heavy debts with the West, and thus had a debtor's interest in further credit. 3) Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia realized the necessity of Western aid for modernization. Bettina S. Hass-Hurni, "The Relevance of Economic Issues at the Belgrade Conference," intereconomics, May-June 1978, 142-143, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 121-122.

¹⁶²Increased economic cooperation necessitates many more direct contacts between Americans and people of all levels in the East. These contacts offer those in the East an opportunity to observe the personal freedoms and liberties which we enjoy, and the effective and efficient operation of Western trade, industry, and technology in a decentralized and open economic setting. Although economic cooperation alone is far too weak an instrument to achieve the economic, political, and humanitarian goals we seek, such relationships, over time, can contribute importantly to greater flexibility and more openness in the economic and social systems of the Communist countries. Elliot L. Richardson, "Basket Two May Bring Intangible Benefits," Statement by Secretary of Commerce, Washington, January 14, 1977, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ninety-Fifth Congress, January 14, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 94-95, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 134-135.

¹⁶³Gregory Grossman, "The Economic Bargaining Chips," Statement by Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley, Implementation of Helsinki Accords, Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ninety-Fifth Congress, January 14, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 140-141, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 136-137.

had not been seen since the implementation of the satellite system.¹⁶⁴

Although a causal relationship between the Basket 3 accords and the fracturing of the Soviet political buffer is difficult to prove, one key piece of evidence in favor of the impact of the Helsinki Final Act was the subsequent signing in Czechoslovakia of Charter 77, which became the foundation for political opposition in Czechoslovakia. Although not a blueprint for an organization or opposition party, Charter 77 based itself on economic, social, and cultural rights which "... were confirmed at Helsinki in 1975 and came into force in our country on 23 March 1976. From that date, (Czech) citizens have the right, and (the Czech) state the duty, to abide by them." Signed by fifteen-hundred East Central European dissidents, including eventual Czech President Vaclav Havel, Charter 77 represented the sort of systemic rip imposed on the political fabric of the iron curtain made possible by the Helsinki Final Act. The Basket 3 provisions of the Helsinki Final Act demonstrated the sort of concessions which

¹⁶⁴Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Political Relations and Contacts," The Helsinki Process and East-West Relations: Progress in Perspective: Report on the Positive Aspects of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975-1984, (Washington D.C.: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1985), 8-10, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 153-154.

were required by the growing internal economic-political weakness of Soviet Russia.¹⁶⁵

The first approach to the growing inability of Soviet policy to successfully confront the economic problem involved increased attempts to secure Western industrial advances, codified through the Basket 2 accords of the Helsinki Final Act. This approach produced human rights concessions, which in turn created the first openings in the political wall protecting Soviet society from the dangerous contagion of the West. The second approach involved internal economic restructuring, and produced repercussions which not only accelerated the dismantling of the East Central European buffer, but which removed from the Soviet regime the political will to restore that buffer once it began to disintegrate.

At the heart of any discussion of perestroika, with its loose talk of market mechanisms, worker initiative, and increased productivity, lies a myth that must first be put to rest: that Gorbachev, when he first instituted economic restructuring in 1985-1986, intended fundamental change in either the political control of the Soviet Union, or in the essential socialist understandings governing commercial activity. A popular analogy with some Soviet observers is that Gorbachev and perestroika were to Communism in the 1980's

¹⁶⁵H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 209-212, in Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism - A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 163-166.

what Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal were to capitalism in the 1930's: agents seeking improvement within an already existing system. Just as New Deal reforms utilized state solutions to improve capitalism, so too did perestroika attempt market solutions to improve and strengthen socialism.¹⁶⁶

By 1985, despite contacts with the West, the traditional Soviet economic growth program was still in place. Declining labor productivity coupled with an aging capital stock coaxed a rise in net fixed capital investment from seventeen percent of GNP to twenty-six percent of GNP in the early 1980's. Because of the high rate of capital repairs, total capital investment peaked at thirty-five percent. Predictably, these investments did not see a corresponding rise in productivity. Output of machine tools, steel, coal, and petroleum declined. Overall growth fell to two tenths to two percent. Given that not only capital but military expenditures as well increased during this period, the impact on Soviet standards of living was severe. Throughout this downward economic slide the key ingredient of those initial high 1930's growth rates, iron-fisted government repression and control, remained useless as a positive stimulus. Some other tool, some sort of carrot, was required to revive technology, efficiency, and

¹⁶⁶H. Stein, "Perestroika: Gorbachev's New Deal?" The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 1989, al.

productivity in order to halt the negative economic spiral.¹⁶⁷

The initial elements of perestroika were on three different levels: government bureaucracy, industrial management, and labor efficiency. All levels of restructuring attempted to create two very different things: a general atmosphere (political, social, commercial) conducive to greater individual creativity and productive effort, and specific measures designed to take advantage of this new atmosphere and to channel this increased productivity into intended areas.¹⁶⁸ In each of these areas, perceived to be the greatest obstacle to improvement was the continued stultifying presence of a bloated Party bureaucracy, no longer revolutionary or particularly Communist, but rather devoted to continued privilege and prestige.

¹⁶⁷Marshall Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economist," 29. "Massed Against the Past," 13.

¹⁶⁸The intended atmosphere was best described as a regulated market economy by which it was meant that the economy would be nine parts regulated and one part market. In other words, market mechanisms would be utilized under ministerial control. At the bureaucratic level, perestroika involved the coalescing of over seventy-five scattered ministries into a series of super-ministries such as when the six separate farm ministries were combined into the giant new State Agro-Industry Committee (Gosagroprom). At the industrial management level, correct atmosphere was to flow from the concept of enterprise autonomy. The five year plans did not disappear, they merely assumed a more advisory status, a launch point for the more detailed enterprise level planning. At the level of worker efficiency, perestroika ensured the workers of their own expendability: the industrial proletariat could be fired for poor productivity. All of these measures, in government, in industry, and in labor strategy hoped to spark greater creativity, initiative, and productivity. "Market Bidding," The Economist, April 8, 1990, 43-46. R. Kellogg, "Modeling Soviet Modernization," 38-39. P. Gumbel, "Moscow Tackles No.1 Domestic Problem," The Wall Street Journal, October 3, 1989, A13.

What followed in the halting footsteps of perestroika was a concerted attack on the Communist Party bureaucracy through the instrument of public scrutiny labeled glasnost. Given the position of the Party as a guarantor of regime survival and ideological legitimacy, this attack is a curious one with competing explanations. One theory proposes that Gorbachev believed that after seventy-two years of the Soviet experiment, there existed in the Union the idea of the Soviet citizen - productive, disciplined, Marxist-oriented. The bureaucracy of the Party was a burden holding back the productive efforts of this vast body of Soviet citizens. Communist social and economic progress then, could best be pursued not through the activities of the Party, but through the efforts of the Soviet citizenry as a whole.¹⁶⁹

There is some support for this analysis of glasnost in the initial conduct of perestroika. Critical to any discussion of the atmosphere and productivity which were the goals of economic restructuring is some understanding of the ultimate ambition of all the hoped-for efficiency. The average Soviet citizen, free of the shackle of state interference, invigorated by the flush of enterprise autonomy, and infused with a sober, disciplined work-ethic, was meant to utilize his new technical ingenuity towards enriching the aggregate Soviet

¹⁶⁹Kenneth Jowitt, "The Strength and Character of Conservative and Reactionary Forces," lecture to the conference Beyond Leninism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, University of California at Berkeley, March 15, 1991.

economy - an amorphous concept distinct and apart from the welfare of Soviet society. So while perestroika focused reforms on supply or productivity, the demand signals for supply were depressed in two important and mutually supporting ways: through planning, which continued to support the machine tool industry at the expense of consumer goods production (a' la the first Five Year Plan), and through strict control of retail prices. Such specific policies were intended to insure that growth spurred by increased efficiency would benefit approved, rather than wasteful, segments of the economy. This ultimate goal in turn assumed a broad population in favor with the approved targets of increased productivity. Acceptance on the part of the population implied certain assumptions about that population itself - assumptions which found expression in glasnost.¹⁷⁰

Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the removal of Party prestige revealed the existence of Russian, Lithuanian, Uzbek, and other national citizens, but precious little Soviet citizenship. Once uncapped, however, the genie revealed by the attack on the Party could not be easily put back in its bottle. Glasnost took on a life of its own, with each revelation producing demands for new revelations. This process in turn required of Gorbachev a precarious balancing act between the public agitation produced by glasnost (itself

¹⁷⁰ Marshall Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economist," 33. "When the Price is Wrong," The Economist, February 2, 1991, 45.

a product of perestroika) and reactionary forces within the Party, the Army, and the KGB. This need to balance his regime between these competing interests meant that Gorbachev was in a poor position to respond firmly to the uprisings which occurred in East Central Europe in 1989, in the breakaway Baltic Republics in January 1991, or within Moscow itself in August 1991.¹⁷¹ Without discounting the factor of ruling personality, one can suggest that the constituent damage wrought by glasnost (itself a problem of economic incapacity) removed from Gorbachev the personal regime security from which he might have acted more harshly, and in fact presented him with a series of choices that he otherwise would not have had to make.

The collapse of the second security phase was caused not by a failure of the East Central European buffer to adequately shield Soviet society from the dangerous virus of Western industrial democracy, but rather from an internal Soviet political failure and moral collapse. This Soviet political failure revolved around the inability of Communist economic policy to maintain adequate levels of economic growth, particularly in the field of high technology dominated by Western industry. Soviet policy at different times attempted to overcome the economic problem by increased commercial ties

¹⁷¹Certainly some credit must be given to the person of Gorbachev. When faced with a situation that in past circumstances would have elicited harsh political repression, he chose to ride the whirlwind rather than attempt to blow it out.

with the West (codified in the Helsinki Final Act), and by internal economic reform (through the program of perestroika). Ultimately, both approaches carried political costs which the Soviet regime proved unable to overcome: first, the exposure of East Central European societies to greater contacts with the West, and secondly, internal political instability which made difficult an adequate response to the results of this exposure. The uprisings in East Central Europe in 1989, and throughout the Soviet Union in 1991, were a product of the turbulence created by this political inability to solve the Soviet economic problem.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The collapse of both the first and second security phases in East Central Europe was prompted by an evolving internal weakness in the hegemonic power within a particular phase; in each case the weakness of the hegemonic power was accelerated by social and political changes within of East Central Europe. In particular, the collapse of the first security phase resulted from the inability of the Western democracies to solve the problem of Germany, and subsequently, East Central Europe became the arena within which the German problem was to run its initial course. The collapse of the second security phase resulted from the inability of the Soviet Union to solve its economic problem, and in that case also, East Central

Europe became the first avenue of Western penetration of the satellite buffer system.

VI. REBUILDING THE BUFFER, DESTROYING THE HIGHWAY

*"This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It can not be otherwise."*¹⁷²

*"The people of Central and Eastern Europe 'resolutely reject any ideas of gray or buffer zones. They imply a continued division of the continent. ... Without a secure Poland and a secure Central Europe, there is no secure and stable Europe'."*¹⁷³

The United States and its Western European allies should exercise caution and restraint with regard to formal integration of East Central Europe within the common security institutions of the West. Contained within this argument is the assertion that a cautious approach is one in which the states of East Central Europe are retained as a political and geographic buffer between Western Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States; contained within this assertion is the idea that a security buffer should be retained in such a way as to reduce as much as possible those factors which would turn it into a highway transporting a political threat into the West at some time in the future.

¹⁷²Stalin, in conversation with Tito during the Second World War. Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin, 114.

¹⁷³"Address by President Lech Walesa of Poland on the occasion of His Visit to NATO July 3, 1991," Press Release, Republic of Poland, Brussels, in Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, 143.

Since 1919, security foundations and specific architecture in East Central Europe have followed a repetitive cycle of policy behavior on behalf of the external power placed by circumstances into a position of preponderant influence within the region. This cycle of policy behavior contains elements both of initial success, as well as of eventual failure. Exposing the two contradictory elements of this repetitive cycle, by disclosing a consistent pattern contained in five dependent variables, has been the task of the previous two chapters. Understanding the relationship between the current security environment in East Central Europe and traditional security conditions is the task of subsequent discussion.

. Specifically, can one demonstrate that the foundations which governed past security policy still exist in the post-Cold War world of East Central Europe? And, from those similar foundations, can one argue that traditional security structures should emerge to govern future understandings? Is current policy in East Central Europe embarked less on formulating a New World Order, and engaged instead in the task of imposing an old order on a not so new world? Is it possible to construct policy which can emulate past successes while at the same time avoiding past mistakes, or are the two elements of the traditional security cycle since 1919 inseparable?

**A. IN DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL FOUNDATIONS: COLLECTIVE SECURITY
VERSUS THE REGIONAL HEGEMON**

Throughout the first two security phases in East Central Europe, the constant governing all other security considerations was the presence of a hegemonic power adjacent to regional borders, and the subordination (born of geopolitical weakness) of the states of East Central Europe to the wishes of that more powerful neighbor. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which convened at Paris in November 1990 was the first (and most powerful) attempt by the newly created democratic regimes in East Central Europe to escape a traditional status as stepchild between two warring parents, dependent on either parent (but preferring the Western one) for security and protection. This attempt to remove entirely the hegemon/client status quo was believed possible within the fabric of an all-European collective security.

Several factors contributed to the euphoria of the East Central Europeans for the ideals and prospects of an all-European security arrangement. The CSCE at Paris was encouraged by American policy makers as a mechanism with which to hasten a then just begun Soviet military withdrawal from East Central Europe. Moscow, which had long encouraged a pan-European security process (indeed, Soviet strategy in this regard had been the driving force behind the original CSCE in 1975) as a way of weakening NATO and reducing American

influence, encouraged East Central European enthusiasm at Paris in 1990. Admittedly, this Soviet encouragement was conducted from a slightly different policy slant; by the Paris Conference, Soviet policy, under the guise of Gorbachev's 'Common European Home', focussed much more on keeping the Soviet Union in Europe, than on keeping the Americans out of Europe.¹⁷⁴

Also, there was still some surprise at the ease of the 1989 revolutions, and the depth of Soviet commitment not to stop the revolutions by force. Both Czechoslovakia's Havel and Hungary's Antall had some hope that the Paris Conference was but a step in a greater process of spiritual, moral, and political democratic union. The important analysis to take away from the idea of pan-Europeanism espoused at Paris was that political unity implied the idea of political equality, the reduction of client status, and the removal of an external hegemon as a security requirement.¹⁷⁵

The move by Soviet Russia in January 1991 to repress the independence movements in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, combined with the complete inability of the all-European security system to either deter, modify, or end Soviet actions

¹⁷⁴Mikhail Gorbachev, "A Common European Home," July 6, 1989 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 61, No. 27, 1989, 6-7, in Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism, 266-267.

¹⁷⁵"Further Reportage on Paris CSCE Summit - Hungary's Antall Speaks," Budapest MTI, 20 Nov 90, FBIS, 23 Nov 90. and "CSRF President Havel Addresses CSCE Summit," Prague Hospodarske Noviny, 20 Nov 90, FBIS, 26 Nov 90.

served largely to destroy East Central European hopes at escape from traditional security constraints.¹⁷⁶ In the immediate aftermath of the Baltic repression, the East Central European democracies embarked on a second (still ongoing) attempt to escape the traditional security role: the campaign for outright membership in NATO, complete with security guarantee. East Central Europe would cease to be a buffer between Russia and the West by becoming part of the West.¹⁷⁷

In a paradoxical way, membership within NATO has been perceived by the East Central Europeans as a security architecture which would eliminate buffer status, whereas membership within the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was never perceived as anything but an affirmation of that traditional role on behalf of Soviet power. This perceptual contradiction is the product of three factors: the political relationships within either alliance between member states, the domestic political environment within member states, and

¹⁷⁶In the case of the crackdown in the Baltics, CSCE moved to condemn the Soviet action under basket one principles. The Eastern Europeans were reminded by the Soviets of the peculiar qualities of unanimity amongst thirty-five voting members. Beck, E., "Lithuania Gets Havel Backing," 16 Feb 91, The Times, p.10:f.

¹⁷⁷As opposed to cooperating with, supported by, aided by, cheered on by, affiliated with, or associated with the West.

"Defense Minister Interviewed on Warsaw Pact, Gulf," Budapest Nepszabadsag, FBIS, 25 January 1991, p.39. Drozdiak, W., "Havel Urges NATO to Seek Ties With East's New Democracies," The Washington Post, 22 March 1991, p.a.18:4. Beck, E., "Hungary Votes to Join NATO Council," The Times, 31 January 91, p.11:b. Keifer F., "East Europeans Seek Closer Ties With NATO," The Christian Science Monitor, 21 March 1991, p.1:1. Szymandarski Appointed to NATO Political Body," Warsaw Domestic Service, FBIS, 4 December 1990, p.27.

the cultural relationship between the Russian and East Central European societies.¹⁷⁸ In short, the obvious satellite client status embodied in the WTO, based on the ever present threat of military crackdown, insured that activities in East Central Europe would reflect rather than dictate Soviet policy.¹⁷⁹

By way of contrast, the voluntary nature of NATO, as well as the independent voice and relative equality of its members produced an alliance in which all members served the interest of the group. This rather optimistic interpretation of NATO is not meant to deny the preponderant American position within the alliance, or the often expressed resentment of that

¹⁷⁸The last is a critical point, because it is central to the East Central European self-identity. "In Central Europe, the eastern border of the West, everyone has always been particularly sensitive to the dangers of Russian might." The signal manifesto of this European self identity is by Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," Edmund White, Trans., The New York Review of Books, April 26, 1984, 33-38, in Gale Stokes, ed. From Stalinism to Pluralism, 217-223.

¹⁷⁹The Warsaw Pact was a curious organization, only marginally dedicated to collective defense against the West, and more intensely concentrated against popular uprisings within the Pact itself. Established on May 14, 1955 ostensibly to counter the German membership in NATO formalized nine days earlier, and later updated in 1969, the Pact's two principal organs were the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) and Combined Armed Forces (CAF) headquarters. Head of the CAF was allocated on a rotating basis amongst the Deputy Defense Ministers of the participating countries. Throughout the history of the Pact, headquarters remained in Moscow. Operational reality, of course, was somewhat different. In event of conflict, member country forces were to be subordinated not to the CAF, but to the Soviet High Command. Soviet High Command staffs, unlike their counterparts in NATO, had no non-Soviet member representation. The only use of combined Pact forces, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, provided ample evidence of this Soviet control, as the entire operation was run from a Soviet High Command Headquarters Forward Command Post in Legnica, Poland. David L. Clarke, "The Military Institutions of the Warsaw Pact," Report on Eastern Europe, December 7, 1990, 28-31. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces Summary, Defense Research Reference Series, DIA, February 1989, 7-8, 15-16, 19-20. Michael Charlton, The Eagle and the Small Birds, 138-139.

position by individual alliance members,¹⁸⁰ but is meant rather to imply that despite the American military position in Europe, no single member - a Germany or a France - could be said to serve the United States at the expense of its own respective self-interests.

Disappointment in the collective security workings of the CSCE, coupled with a persistent enthusiasm for membership in NATO (with the security guarantee associated with membership) produced in regional policy deliberations a strong desire to escape traditional client/buffer status by casting East Central Europe as "the eastern border of the West."¹⁸¹ Unfortunately, the very strength of the local desire for regional inclusion in the West has produced the opposite result of that intended: the confirming of a traditional hegemon-client relationship as a precursor to any final regional post-Cold War security arrangement; Western political leadership can conduct security policy sure in the knowledge that East Central Europe desires no arrangements outside of

¹⁸⁰France in particular has most often expressed discontent with the American position within the alliance. American leadership has on the main downplayed internal dissent. President Bush's Rome press conference was a classic example of this inter-alliance dynamic at work: "Now, when you have frank discussions in a group as big as NATO, are there going to be some nuances of difference? Of course, there are differences. But I think on this instance, France was most constructive." "The President's News Conference in Rome, Italy, November 8, 1991," 1605.

¹⁸¹Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," 217. It is all very well for Lech Walesa to reject a continued buffer status which would in his words 'imply a continued division of the continent,' when he very readily believes that such a division does in fact exist. Walesa would have been more honest in saying that buffer status 'implies a continued division of the continent, and the exclusion of East Central Europe from that side most favorably endowed by this division.'

those provided by the West.¹⁸² In this way, the constant governing all other security considerations throughout the first two security phases in East Central Europe¹⁸³ has remained a constant at the outset of the third phase, despite the best efforts of local regimes to escape this traditional hegemon-client security constraint.

B. HAPHAZARD BIRTH, POLITICAL CONTEST, AND THE THREAT TO THE WEST

Despite protestations by many observers, current threats to Western security are not particularly unique, nor are they particularly new, *if current threats are seen in the context of those traditionally faced by the external power placed by circumstances into a position of preponderant influence in East Central Europe*. Corralled under the semantic umbrella of 'instability', the hazards present in the post-Soviet world are dangerous not so much because they are aimed at Western military structures, but because they impinge on the internal political stability and continued harmony within the aggregate states of the Western alliance. Put so succinctly by President Bush at his Rome press conference, "the enemy, a

¹⁸²By this it is meant that despite future political changes to include even the most drastic authoritarianism, it is simply too fantastic to consider the possibility of regimes in East Central Europe, willfully and without coercion, concluding security alliances with post-Soviet Russia after the Russian legacy of the Cold War. In this way, Western hegemony in East Central Europe is as much a product of moral authority as of any other factor.

¹⁸³The presence of a hegemonic power adjacent to regional borders, and the subordination (born of geopolitical weakness) of the states of East Central Europe to the wishes of that more powerful neighbor.

Threat Analysis

	Hegemon	Source	Nature	Reason
1919:	The West	Bolshevism	Internal/ Political	Vulnerability in an exhausted post-war environment to revolutionary upheaval
1945:	USSR plural	Western democracy	Internal/ Political	Vulnerability after 28 years of autocratic rule to explosive consequences of Western political freedoms
1989- 1992:	The West	The foreign and domestic policy fallout from Soviet Russia	Internal/ Political	Economic, political, military, and social responsibility for the disasters of the Soviet experiment

TABLE II. ANALYSIS OF THREAT BY SECURITY PHASE

monolithic, powerful Soviet Union is no longer the enemy. The enemy is uncertainty. The enemy is unpredictability. The friend is stability."¹⁸⁴ What, then, are the concrete expressions of instability? How do those expressions form an internal political threat to the West? Why does the political threat to the West demand of Western policy that it consider post-Soviet Russia cautiously, best kept behind an East Central European buffer rather than integrated into some sort

¹⁸⁴ "The President's News Conference in Rome, Italy, November 8, 1991," 1607. In a call for establishing regional democracy, Secretary Baker again repeated this perception of threat: "Without legitimacy, there will never be stability. Without stability, Western security will never be assured." James A. Baker, "America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What Has to be Done," 14.

of formal architecture within the West (and thus eliminating any need for a buffer at all)?

One of the signal difficulties for Western planners in a post-Cold War security environment is the lack of a single issue focus - a problem extant neither in 1919 by virtue of the juxtaposition of threat with Bolshevism, nor in 1945 by virtue of the untrammelled authority of Stalin's particular vision. Such clarity is not the case now, the absence of which is used largely to dismiss the threat. A threat does exist, however - multi-faceted and nebulous to be sure, but real all the same - which, like those that preceded it in guiding East Central European security conditions, is essentially political in nature; the various strands of this hazardous fabric can be grouped for the most part under a single heading of *responsibility*.

The collapse of the Soviet experiment produced in regions of prior Soviet dominance military, political, economic and social dislocations of a magnitude bordering on the fantastic. Both magnitude and specific characteristics insure that certain of these dislocations have a direct and continuing impact on the political health and even the internal stability of the West - not only in terms of collective political identity, but also in terms of the internal workings of component members. Accordingly, a prudent policy would limit the fallout of the post-Soviet dislocations, while at the same time avoiding the exhausting consequences of so great a task.

This necessity for avoidance requires a certain detachment and freedom of action - a willingness to be responsive to, without being responsible for - which should come from an understanding that many of the post-cold war dislocations can be solved only in the long-term, and some not at all.

The first facet of the threat involves responsibility for the disaster of Marxist economic philosophy and the implication of such a responsibility for Western governments. The Russian economic collapse has produced three separate sets of security problems for the West: the removal of East Central Europe's chief economic supplier (particularly of oil), the removal of East Central Europe's principle customer, and the generation of a huge body of potential economic refugees. Western ability to respond completely to this economic black hole is not increased by optimism. Although much can be done; the danger exists in the degree that Western economies will be strained by the effort, as well as the degree that Western populations will be angered by the strain. In this way, the threat to the West revolves not around the post-Soviet economic disaster per se, but around the dislocations involved with Western efforts to reverse the economic disaster.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵The black-hole potential of Eastern European and Russian regimes concerning economic aid was discussed by Stephen Popper of the RAND Corporation at the conference Beyond Leninism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, U.C. Berkeley, 15 March 1991.

Any agenda of economic aid to the former Soviet Union which would hope to produce anything beyond stop-gap emergency relief would have to be classified as daring bordering on reckless. The scope of the collapse, the lack of any optimistic near-term forecast, and the intimidating prospect of societal-level psychological retraining concerning fundamental issues of

The military threat from Russia is slight in the near term, but were it still strong, the extension of Western military boundaries would do little to contain it, while the implications of such an extension would weaken the West at its vulnerable internal/political core. Certainly the sheer size of the Western military problem would become formidable, and in lieu of modern integrated host forces (an unlikely eventuality)¹⁸⁶ would involve the expensive stationing of Western troops (including German forces) on host soil¹⁸⁷. The political costs of such a policy would be formidable in

market-mechanism and work ethic all indicate an aide program involving a lot of money, managed by a lot of skilled people, over a long period of time, with only modest prospects of success. Professor Jacques Sapir of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris has postulated two economic scenarios. The first, a fast recovery scenario, would have the fifteen Republics achieving 1988 levels of GNP by 1997 at the earliest. A second, and in his opinion, more likely scenario would have no recovery to 1988 levels of GNP prior to 2000. Lecture at NPGS, NS 4720, 3 October 1991.

The difficulties of economic recovery are adequately illustrated by the German experiment, which has been far more costly than was anticipated. Because recovery is tied with German domestic politics, failure to provide recovery quickly has produced a significant amount of internal disillusionment and dissatisfaction in both the former East and in the former West, factors which provide a stimulus for a future instability.

The economic refugee question is a considerable one, and one that is already responsible for political fallout in the West. Recent attacks on Algerian Harkis (former French Army veterans) in France (sparked by Jean Le Pen's Action Francaise style political program), attacks on Turkish Workers in Germany, and Polish migrant laborers in Germany illustrate the problem, as well as the limits accrued to a Western solution. Gati, C., "Central Europe is Scared," New York Times, 14 February 1991, p.a,27:2. Bugajksi, J., "A Squeeze in East Europe," Christian Science Monitor, 21 February 1991, p.19:1. Aron, L., "the Russians are Coming," The Washington Post, 27 January 1991, p.c,1:1.

¹⁸⁶The problems of creating a professional military force, compatible with the West in terms of equipment and training, are difficult to overcome in a post-cold war time of economic collapse, social reorientation, and fiscal restraint. Weydenthal, J., "Building a National Security System," Report on Eastern Europe, 14 June 1991, pp.12-16. "Defense Minister Comments on Coming Army Changes," Prague Television Service, FBIS, 2 November 1990, p.18. Clarke, D., "A Realignment of Military Forces in Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern Europe, 8 March 1991, pp.41-45.

¹⁸⁷Weitz, pp.30-35. Eide, pp.1-6.

the host country alone, but at an internal/Western level, the results could be explosive - involving fears of a Germany resurgent in its role as security spokesman for the West¹⁸⁸.

The third, and perhaps greatest, threat produced by the collapse of the Soviet experiment revolves around the issue of ethnic nationalism - a multi-tiered, sensitive, and extremely dangerous challenge to Western political health and stability - operating as a set of four dominoes, each placed progressively closer to the political heart of the West. Each of these four dominoes is more effectively contained by the continued use of East Central Europe as a buffer (its

¹⁸⁸The renewed German problem will be discussed in a later, speculative section concerning the collapse of the third security phase. There is a significant debate over the effects of East Central European inclusion in a Western Security alliance on the behavior of united Germany. Some argue that inclusion serves to reduce German status, by effectively reducing the scope of any independent German security policy. Others (including this author) argue that East Central European security membership would necessitate more active Western military involvement, and that Western military involvement (by virtue of the ongoing reduction of American presence, and the German geographic and economic position) would translate into German military involvement. Germany would then be in a position to use its military influence in East Central Europe (assuming that East Central Europe is a full member of the West) to control East Central Europe's alliance votes, and thus to control the Western European security agenda (much in the same way that American strength once allowed American policy desires to control the European agenda).

German policy leadership may in fact be divorced from its unfortunate past record, and there is no evidence that popular German opinion would desire such a prominent security role, but German leadership is feared by many nonetheless. The most prominent among those that fear the Germans are the Germans themselves, who seem to want an arrangement which would produce a continental Germany, rather than a German continent. This fear could create divisions in the political fabric of the West. "The German Question," The Economist, 12 October 1991, pp.18-19. Yost, D., "France in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs, vol.69, Winter 1990/91, pp.113-115.

"A challenge could evolve from chaos on the territory of the former Soviet Union, from ethnic conflicts and political instability in Eastern Europe, and from the redefinition of Germany's role. ... existing European institutions cannot by themselves establish a balance between Germany and its partners, even less between Germany and the former Soviet Union." Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," 5-6.

traditional role), rather than as a member of the Western system.¹⁸⁹

A great risk, of course, is that the disintegration of the Russian imperium will produce a violence within former Union borders subject to leakage, and that a Western security guarantee would require a Western military containment effort.¹⁹⁰ The problem resides both in the scope of the violence (and thus in the level of necessary commitment), and the choosing among combatants necessitated by commitment.¹⁹¹ The second risk (or domino) concerns the challenge to post-Soviet borders by dissatisfied former clients, again with the potential to draw in Western resources too closely bound by

¹⁸⁹Here the words ethnic nations and nations are used interchangeably, using as a definition that "the essence of nations ... (is that they are) ... the largest human grouping characterized by a myth of common ancestry. The historical accuracy of the myth is irrelevant. ... Offshoot nations are formed when an important segment of a nation has been geographically separated from the parent group for a period of time sufficient for it to develop a strong sense of separate consciousness. Members retain an awareness that they derive from the parent stock, but they believe that the characteristics they have in common are less significant than those that make them unique." Conner, W., "Ethnonationalism," in Weiner, M., and Huntington, S., ed., Understanding Political Development, 1987, pp.211-212.

¹⁹⁰Some actively call for such a posture: "Moreover, if a no-man's-land is to be avoided in Eastern Europe, NATO ought to leave no doubt that pressures against these countries would be treated as a challenge to Western security, whatever the formal aspect of this undertaking." Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," 7.

¹⁹¹The most obvious scenario involves a Russian/Ukrainian conflict, created out of some crisis involving either the armed forces, control of nuclear weapons, borders, economic policy/conditions, or the treatment of minority populations. The near-term prospects of such a scenario seem unlikely. The consequences of such a conflict, however, should it (or another like it) occur, would be tremendous.

Despite the unlikelihood of such a scenario, the possibility of regional military conflict is one of seven scenarios proposed by the Pentagon as the basis of post-Cold War military planning. Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold-War Era: Plans for Hypothetical Conflicts and Big Budgets," The New York Times, February 17, 1992, 1. Barton Gellman, "Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower," The Washington Post, March 11, 1992, 1.

security guarantees.¹⁹² A third domino, implying much the same dangers, involves ethnic/border disputes within Eastern Europe - disputes which may lose their element of dormancy under the strain of worsening conditions.¹⁹³ The risk of a quagmire-ish Western military involvement frames each of these ethnic-national dominoes. The real risk, however is more internal to the West, and thus more dangerous.¹⁹⁴

The internal/political fallout of indiscriminate Western involvement in post-Soviet ethnic disputes carries the risk of both interstate and intrastate instability, with the first creating and then in turn evolving from the circumstances of

¹⁹²The two most likely scenarios involve Romanian claims in Moldava, and Polish claims in Lithuania. Lithuanian efforts at independence repeatedly stressed the need to return to 1919-1940 borders. Such a border excludes roughly one-third of current Lithuanian territory from Lithuanian political control (including the capitol of Vilnius, the Polish city of Wilno). The Poles have not closed this border issue. Bourne, E., "Central European Reformers Slip into Historic Feuds," The Christian Science Monitor, 1 May 1991, p.6:4.

¹⁹³At present, national rivalry and irredentist claims among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary demand a lower portion of public passion. Unfortunately, the rivalries are no less real, each a malevolent presence submerged beneath greater concerns. Historically, Poland has always claimed the Czech industrial region of Teschen on the Polish-Silesian border. Czechoslovakia has been concerned about the Slovak minority in Hungary. Hungary claims territory in Slovakia, Romania (Transylvania), and Yugoslavia (Vojvodina and parts of Croatia). At various times, Walesa and Havel have maintained a running personal feud, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have engaged in sharp diplomatic exchanges over the failure of joint-border hydroelectric projects, and Hungary has pursued an arms export policy designed to destabilize Yugoslavia. Bourne, p.6:4. Rothschild, pp.8-9. Kusin, V., "Security Concerns in Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern Europe, 8 March 1991, p.26. Boyes, R., "Havel-Walesa Cold War Shows Hint of a Thaw," The Times, 19 February 1991, p.8b.

¹⁹⁴The above stated scenarios are related independent of an analysis of probability. In the current context, their potential is low. But in rapidly worsening conditions, they become much more likely. Reference to the immediate post-Versailles activity (specifically the Polish attack on Russia, and the joint Romanian/Hungarian war) indicate the degree that regimes, if given will go to insure a measure of legitimacy, if given no other entry into greater popular support.

the second. Ethnic dispute requires of Western members a course of action and an evaluation of right and wrong among the participants in the dispute. This evaluation (itself a product of internal ethnic dynamic and external mistrust for fellow member intentions) is by no means unanimous within the West, nor is it likely to be in the future.¹⁹⁵ The subsequent course of action would in turn feed an intrastate instability, the potential of which was the source of the original evaluative disagreement.¹⁹⁶ The result could be the

¹⁹⁵The Yugoslavia issue is a good example of the dilemma and its alliance fallout. Initially the Germans supported recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. The French, fearing a Teutonic Bloc across Central Europe, and also struggling with their own internal Basque separatist movement, supported a united Serbia (as did Spain, Britain, and Italy, for similar reasons). "Not 1914, but not 1991 either," The Economist, 10 August 1991, p.37.

¹⁹⁶Imagine the consequences that German support for Croatia (a move feared by Great Britain because of her own ethnic vulnerabilities), and then subsequent Croatian support for Ulster separatism, would have on the separatist movement (because of the hope offered by Balkan success), British internal politics (because of the need for greater military effort in Northern Ireland), and on British relations with Germany (because Germany started it all by recognizing Croatia).

It is not necessary that support for Western ethnic populations be material; heightened awareness, precedent, and moral parallels can have a tremendous impact on popular movements. What would be the Western response to outside intervention in internal ethnic disputes, once the precedent of such interventions has been established?

An interesting case in point is Scotland. Feelings of disenfranchisement (occurring over thirteen years of Conservative rule in which only nine out of seventy-two Scottish Members of Parliament have been conservative), a decline in traditional industries, and a deep sense of place have produced the following numbers: one in five Scots favors the status quo, seven out of ten "no longer consider themselves British, and eight out of ten want constitutional change." (numbers compiled by David McRone of Edinburgh University). James Kellas of Glasgow University asks the question clearly: "if Slovenia and Croatia can be accepted as independent states, why not Scotland?" Knight, R., "The Ghost of Robert Bruce Stirs Again," U.S. News and World Report, 24 February 1992, p.44-45.

What is implied here is not the likelihood that the individual constituents of the West once again will go to war with each other over East Central Europe, but that East Central Europe could be the locus anti-integrationist sentiment within Western Europe, could in fact be a cause of instability so feared by President Bush.

translation of these internal ethnic issues into external inter-member mistrust.

The retention by the West of a non-entangling security relationship with Eastern Europe, of the retention of a traditional buffer status, would insure that Western involvement in the ethnic fallout of post-Soviet Russia remained a product of choice rather than obligation, that the scope of the threat could be managed rather than reacted to (although never altogether eliminated), and that difficult choices on issues without near-term solutions could be delayed until made consistent with a means of effective action.

The threat emanating from post-Soviet economic, military, and social dislocations is multi-faceted, tenuous, and very real, and is united by a single dangerous idea: Western responsibility for the solutions to those dislocations. The dangers of overextension and internal/political instability, facilitated by the too close a union of East Central Europe and the West, can be best mitigated by a retention on the part of Eastern Europe of traditional roles.

C. GRAND STRATEGY: APPEARANCE INCONSISTENT WITH REALITY

If it is true that the establishment of Western hegemony in East Central Europe and the concurrent creation by post-Soviet dislocations of an internal, political threat to this new Western hegemon are but the first steps in a historically-grounded repetitive policy cycle, then the next logical step

in this cyclical progression would seem to be the establishment in East Central Europe of a political buffer shielding Western societies from the worst effects of the internal political threat. The curious thing is that a de facto plan (discerned largely through the pattern of military, economic, and political activity) does seem to exist concerning the role of East Central Europe within a Western-dominated, post-Cold War security context, and does in fact seem to constrain East Central Europe within a traditional buffer status aimed at shielding Western societies from the threat from the East (in this instance, post-Soviet dislocations translated and exacerbated by the East Central European political dynamic). In this way, modern Western policy makers (perhaps unintentionally) are attempting to use East Central Europe as Stalin used it before them, and as Wilson used it before him.

This view is by no means obvious when compared to the public pronouncements of Western leadership - pronouncements which declare all of the euphoric idealism found in those of the East Central Europeans themselves at Paris in 1990. Statements such as that made by Secretary of Defense Cheney that, "our ultimate goal (is) a united, free, and peaceful Europe,"¹⁹⁷ bode ill for either the maintenance of East

¹⁹⁷ "Statement of Dick Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Meeting of Defense Ministers with Cooperation Partners, April 1, 1992, NATO Headquarters, Brussels."

Central Europe as a buffer, or for traditional fears of a threat from the East. The codification of this rhetoric in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), proposed at the Rome Summit in November 1991 and brought into existence one month later at Brussels, further seems to imply that continental divisions and traditional roles are a thing of the past.¹⁹⁸

Far from ending traditional divisions in Europe, however, organizations such as NACC and the CSCE provide a security umbrella diluted by uncommon goals and mutually exclusive histories, and devoid of any concrete measures beyond a liaison function. By extending common security architecture to fifty-four countries ranging from 'Vladivostok west to Vancouver,' current codifications of security rhetoric provide within a pan-European system the opportunity to pursue national and regional goals. As Henry Kissinger has so pointedly explained the dilemma: "if everybody is allied with everybody in that vast area, will anyone have a special obligation to anyone?"¹⁹⁹ This lack of obligation is

¹⁹⁸ "In the new era of European relations where the confrontation and division of past decades have been replaced by dialogue, partnership and cooperation, we are determined to work towards a new, lasting order of peace in Europe. ... The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation therefore concern us all." Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance, "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, 20th December 1991," Press Communiqué M-NACC-1(91) 111, (Rev), NATO Press Service, 1.

¹⁹⁹ Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," 7.

reflected in the unwillingness of the West to extend direct membership into working security bodies, and the desire on the part of the East Central Europeans for just such a concrete obligation.²⁰⁰

This contradiction between the promises of pan-European security organizations and the abilities of their smaller more established Western counterparts, has prompted calls on the part of some Western analysts for a more rapid evolution from a relationship with East Central Europe characterized by liaison functions, to one involving mutual membership.²⁰¹ Towards these calls, the response of Western leadership has been one of resounding caution.²⁰² Eventual membership is

²⁰⁰Western reluctance was tempered, of course, by the soothing voice of diplomatic compromise. At a moral/spiritual level, speeches were made reaffirming the common democratic culture and destiny of Eastern Europe and the West, specifically in remarks made by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz at the Conference on "The Future of European Security" Prague Czechoslovakia, 25 April 1991, News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and reported as "Delegates on European security," Prague CTK, 25 Apr 91, FBIS, 29 April 1991. Political linkage has grown quite large, and includes Eastern European delegates on all the major organizational committees (although as observers, rather than voting members), including the Atlantic Council, Council of Europe, and Economic Community. Weitz, R., "NATO and the New Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern Europe, 24 May 1991, pp.30-35. Eide, V., "NATO in a Changing World," The RUSI Journal, Spring 1990, pp.1-6. Keifer, F., "NATO recasts its Role in Europe," The Christian Science Monitor, 10 June 1991, p.3:2. Goshko, J., "NATO Pledges Increased Cooperation with Countries of Eastern Europe," The Washington Post, 7 June 1991, p.a.17:1.

All of these links, and subsequent ones made at Maastricht and Rome, have fallen short of the type of integration and security guarantee desired by the Eastern Europeans. The reasons for this Western reluctance revolve around Western perceptions of the threat, perceptions that will be subsequently be examined.

²⁰¹For a persuasive argument for this position, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership."

²⁰²When asked about granting eventual full membership to the East Central Europeans, President Bush responded carefully: "I think it's a little premature on that. And let's get going now on this Council. Let's consult with them. Let's make them know that we have keen interest in their security and in their economic well-being. but I think it's premature to go beyond

not discounted, but rather passed off to a distant future defined by the fulfillment of a vague set of conditions. Given the fear expressed by Western leadership of instability within Europe, the potential for instability contained in post-Soviet Russia, and the reluctance to extend security guarantees east of NATO's traditional borders,²⁰³ one can reasonably conclude that, despite either rhetoric or intentions, East Central Europe is at present confined by Western policy as a buffer against an uncertain future. Considering the concrete economic, military, and political expressions of instability currently confronting the West, as well as the potential for elements within East Central Europe to accelerate those expressions, Western caution is both prudent and desirable, and reflects an ongoing cycle of policy behavior governing security development in East Central Europe.

All of these activities indicate a design for East Central Europe based on the implicit analysis of post-Soviet dislocations as principally an internal domestic threat, dangerous because of its potential for Western overextension and exhaustion. This threat is best contained behind a series of buffer states in East Central Europe, behind a new cordon sanitaire. The new cordon sanitaire is made possible by a

that." "President's News Conference in Rome, Italy, November 8, 1991," 1607.

²⁰³excluding of course the inclusion of former East German territory.

combination of detached involvement with the newly democratic regimes - by selective and non-entangling economic, political, military, and social affiliation and assistance. This detached involvement, which reinforces the status of Eastern states as being of Europe - without allowing them actually to be in Europe - is a prudent answer directed at a fundamental question: "how to convince the Eastern Europeans that they are part of the same community of nations, without gravely impairing the progress towards economic and political integration achieved in the West."²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴Eyal, J., "Eastern Europe: The Process of De-Colonization," RUSI and BRASSEY'S Defense Yearbook 1991, p.36.

VI. CONCLUSION

"On each count, a question must now be raised. Will German unity undo the political balance in Western Europe? Can the break-up of a vast eastern empire be handled peacefully? Will the West, as a cohesive group of like-minded nations, survive the loss of its common enemy?"²⁰⁵

Optimism about the prospects of the third security phase evolves from the belief that in the first two phases, East Central Europe effectively performed its security function, that the current relationship between the threat and the hegemonic power is similar to the two such relationships which preceded, and that the current, implicit plan responds (as did those before it) to the threat/hegemon relationship. Furthermore, the exacerbating function of East Central Europe vis a vis the threat is reduced as much as is possible, and the process of internal moral collapse, so evident in the eventual failure of the first two phases, is, if not retarded by, then at least not accelerated by the traditional East Central European role.

When the collapse comes, however, precedent would indicate (and analysis of the current threat would tend to confirm) that the source will be an internal moral failing - an inability to solve a fundamental political, economic, or

²⁰⁵ "Schools Brief: Securing Europe's Peace," The Economist, February 15, 1992, 60.

social problem - which will make the West vulnerable to what remains of the post-Soviet dislocations. Accordingly, two avenues serve to make the collapse less likely: expenditure of effort conducted to insure the rapid reduction of the post-Soviet dislocations, and conservation of effort conducted to reduce the possibilities of internal failure. The role of East Central Europe in a Western-dominated, post-cold war security environment, if consistent with the threat and traditional in action, facilitates greatly the positive prospects mitigating against a collapse.

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